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ABSTRACT
United States President Barack Obama issued an Executive order on November 20, 2014
to implement new law regarding the American immigration system and deportations. The
system has long been skewed, and a polarizing issue among both the general public and
of those involved in the United States government. Obama, by issuing this decree, created
a law on his own due to congressional deadlock in creating and passing immigration
reform legislation. However, the constitutionality of his decision to do so has now
become highly debated, with many officials and academics across the country asserting
their beliefs in his legal ability to issue the order. The ability to create laws is explicitly
prescribed to the Legislative branch in the Constitution, but there have been past
examples of Executive authority being necessary so as to preserve the Union and allow
the government to continue. This thesis will examine the constitutionality of Obama’s
Executive decree and the potential precedent that it will set for future Presidents by
analyzing it within the context of John Locke, the original proprietor for the rule of law,
James Madison, the father of the United States Constitution and separation of powers
system, Alexander Hamilton, the forthcoming advocate for an energetic Executive of the
Founding Fathers, the Abraham Lincoln presidency, which involved the crisis known as
the Civil War, and the George W. Bush presidency, widely known as one of the most
polarizing constitutional presidencies in American history. When looking at these past
examples it becomes clear that Barack Obama overstepped his place in the government
with no existential crisis threatening the nation, therefore setting a dangerous precedent
for future Executive’s as well as damaging the force of the separation of powers system.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The growth of partisanship in the United States of America’s political
environment has been well documented over the last seventy-five years, and at this point,
the divide has arrived at its peak. Political deadlocks between different branches of
government and inability to pass legal policy have created frustrations on all sides of the
spectrum, as the separation of powers principles that the country’s constitutional
framework is based upon has created a significant number of ways to stop the passing of
legislation and Executive activity. A now Republican-controlled Congress and a
democratic presidential administration that has been one of the more polarizing
administrations in United States history have resulted in a lack of production in a time
when production seems to be absolutely necessary to solving the nation’s issues.
Currently at the forefront of this deadlock is immigration law, as there have been
numerous issues regarding the temporary protection from deportation for illegal
immigrants, and particularly the children born in America, those with jobs, clean records,
and strong community ties. These children were brought to America by their
undocumented parents, and therefore were not given the choice of arriving illegally,
while the others have integrated themselves as productive and valuable members of
society. The official number of people in this category is unknown, but some news
outlets, such as the New York Times, have estimated that there are between four and five
million 1, which is over a third of the total undocumented resident population (11
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New York Times Editorial Board, “Mr. Obama, Your Move”, The New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/10/opinion/sunday/mr-obama-your-move.html?_r=0, , August 9, 2014
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million2) in the United States today. While this may not be a huge portion of the total
population, most of these people are centered around a few major metropolitan hubs, are
prominent and contributing members of their communities, and have faced a large
amount of hardships to get to where they are with the disadvantages that are inherently
given to undocumented immigrants.
Not only do these immigrants play roles in the country, but citizens of the United
States have also taken up a vested interest in immigration law, primarily because of the
value undocumented immigrants provide in the workforce, civil rights activity, and in
exposing inefficient law enforcement. There is a large amount of wastefulness occurring
in the enforcement of deportations, as they chase millions of people who pose no threat
and help keep the economy afloat by working jobs that the general citizenry avoid at
almost all costs while not complaining about wages and unfair working conditions 3.
There are massive civil rights abuses that expose the prevalence of racism in the United
States today, and the increased publicity for occurrences of racial profiling towards those
that should be deemed innocent has made this more obvious to the general population 4.
In addition, because a lot of the undocumented immigrants, whether they are valuable or
not, fear law enforcement even if they’ve done nothing illegal, ripe conditions for crime
and exploitation flourish wherever they remain hidden 5. With all of these issues
achieving national prominence because of President Obama’s 2012 program that deferred

2

Nakamura, David, “Obama Readies Executive Action on Immigration”, Washington Post,
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deportations of many immigrants who had been brought to the country illegally as
children 6, Congress reallocating resources for Obama to deport 350,000 to 400,000
undocumented immigrants per year 7, and the social stands that undocumented children
under the age of 18 (most of whom are not criminals, drug dealers, violent or non-violent
offenders, and are simply trying to escape the dangers and threats of their home
countries) have been taking by turning themselves over to immigration authorities 8, a
massive pressure from multiple directions is continuously rising on the federal
government to act upon reforming immigration law. However, the previous divide in
Congress (now controlled by the GOP) and differences between Congress and the
presidential administration, as mentioned before, are blocking legislation from being
passed.
The ridiculous sums of money spent on border patrolling have also contributed to
the idea of reforming the system, as the government allocated $11.7 billion to border
security in 2012, which is an extremely high number during the recovery from a financial
crisis 9. Furthermore, Mexico, adjacent to the United States, in terms of domestic
immigration law governing their potential immigrants, is treated under the same rules and
regulations as Switzerland in the center of Europe 10. The current immigration quotas
limit each country to no more than 7% of the total of 700,000 legal immigrant visas each
year, although it seems obvious that countries in closer proximity, and with more reason

6

Nakamura, “Obama Readies Executive Action on Immigration”
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for citizens to leave, would get a higher percentage of the total visas given 11. There are so
few avenues for low and moderately skilled workers to migrate lawfully from foreign
countries to the United States that these migrant workers are forced to break the law to
enter the United States and work 12. In the original theory of the United States
government, a situation like this is supposed to immediately inspire Congress to act on
either reforming or overhauling the immigration law, as there are clearly large
implications economically, politically and socially. Unfortunately, the stubbornness of all
parties involved, and the Democrats losing control of the Senate, is going to result in
extreme difficulties in the passing of legislation on immigration, along with many other
issues.
President Obama and his administration have now decided to drastically act upon
the immigration issue by using his Executive discretionary authority to step over
Congress’ constitutional right of lawmaking and reform immigration law unilaterally 13.
The President, on November 20, 2014, made history at Del Sol High School in Las
Vegas, Nevada, by using an Executive order to temporarily modify immigration law until
legislation can be passed 14. He set the conditions of the “Priority Enforcement Program”,
the name he deemed the program, as follows: “If you’ve been in America for more than
five years; if you have children who are American citizens or legal residents; if you
11

U.S. Citzenship and Immigration Services, “Per Country Limit”,
http://www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary/country-limit
12
Johnson, Kevin and Trujillo, Bernard, “Immigration Law and the US-Mexico Border”, University of
Arizona Press, 2011, pg 1
13
The Washington Post Editorial Board, “Frustration over Stalled Immigration Action doesn’t mean
Obama can act Unilaterally”, The Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/frustrationover-stalled-immigration-action-doesnt-mean-obama-can-act-unilaterally/2014/08/05/9c7bc1c6-1c1c-11e4ae54-0cfe1f974f8a_story.html?wpmk=MK0000200, August 5, 2014
14
Davis, Julie, “Obama’s Immigration Action has Precedents, but May Set a New One”, The New York
Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/politics/obamas-immigration-decision-has-precedents-butmay-set-a-new-one.html?_r=1, November 20, 2014
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register, pass a criminal background check, and you’re willing to pay your fair share of
taxes—you’ll be able to apply to stay in this country temporarily, without fear of
deportation” 15. The program is only meant to be a temporary one until concrete
legislation can be passed, but this seems unlikely anytime soon 16. Moreover, the initiative
can be easily reversed by a future President once in office, so reform may never follow
from the action 17. Obama’s commitment to this action may be established with the right
ideas in mind, but the constitutionality of his action is highly debatable in the context of
the separation of powers, and may not even be a solution to the current problems.
Obama’s frustration due to congressional paralysis over what some people are
considering a humanitarian crisis has become more obvious, and the Republican
controlled House of Representatives has only passed measures that have no chance of
becoming law regarding immigration 18. Obama, because of the congressional inactivity
on productive and beneficial immigration reform legislation, has come to believe that it is
only natural that the Executive moves in to accomplish what the Legislature cannot 19. In
his announcement of the Priority Enforcement Program, Obama said, “Had the House of
Representatives allowed that kind of bill a simple yes-or-no vote, it would have passed
with support from both parties, and today it would be the law. But for a year and a half
now, Republican leaders in the House have refused to allow that simple vote” 20. He
continues by contextualizing his prerogative power usage in the usages of past presidents,

15
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which further exemplifies the dangerous precedent usage of Executive action can set. He
said, “The actions I’m taking are not only lawful, they’re the kinds of actions taken by
every single Republican President and every single Democratic President for the past half
century. And to those members of Congress who question my authority to make our
immigration system work better, or question the wisdom of me acting where Congress
has failed, I have one answer: Pass a bill” 21.
There have been a significant number of attempts at justification of Obama’s
power to act on immigration reform, such as the maintaining of laws that are out of sync
with social reality, the number of immigrants in the United States today being
significantly more than the resources that authorities possess to arrest and deport them
can handle, and the lack of realism in the policies that are becoming a threat to the rule of
law because they force more people to break laws on a consistent basis 22. Supporters are
attempting to justify the plan itself that Obama would institute by saying that he would
only focus on high priority targets so no damage to the economy would be done, a
deterrent would be created for undocumented immigrants to commit less crime so they
are not one of the high priority targets, and the precedent that the Executive branch would
set by suspending the enforcement of the law is more likely to favor the right-wing over
the left in the long run 23. Now, Obama has achieved the legal basis for his Executive
prerogative usage, as the White House unusually released a formal, 33-page Justice

21
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Department memo detailing the action’s legal justifications 24. In this memo, White House
officials and broad array of legal experts, including 10 of the nation’s top legal and
constitutional scholars, call the new policy “lawful” and “within the powers of the
Executive branch” 25. The text of this memo specifically says, “We are law professors and
lawyers who teach, study, and practice constitutional law and related subjects…While we
differ among ourselves on many issues relating to Presidential power and immigration
policy, we are all of the view that these actions are lawful. They are exercises of
prosecutorial discretion that are consistent with governing law and with the policies that
Congress has expressed in the statutes that it has enacted” 26. Obama’s legal counsel has
provided a precedent that could become dangerous in the future without utilizing the past
precedent of necessity, and now Presidents will be able to cite his actions in utilizing their
own, potentially more expansive actions.
The President has previously expressed his belief in the rule of law, however: “If,
in fact, I could solve all these problems without passing laws in Congress, then I would
do so. But we’re also a nation of laws” 27. Clearly, this view has changed, as his
exercising of Executive authority, which is traditionally considered constitutional only in
extraordinary circumstances, has now become one of the most important assertions of
power in presidential history. Obama had previously expressed his desire to work
together with Congress to create a solution plan, but after being rejected on multiple
occasions, it is clear that he has given up on that approach. However, because of the lack
24
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of common ground that his administration and Congress have reached, many proponents
of immigration reform in Congress were expecting the President to take action 28. Illinois’
Democratic Representative Luis Gutierrez of the House of Representatives has been
quoted saying, “I think the President’s going to take action on all…levels. He is going to
take broad, expansive action that the law allows him to take” 29. Gutierrez’s hopes have
now come to fruition with Obama’s announcement of the reform of immigration law as
an Executive order.
Obama’s justification regarding his approach to reforming immigration law has
caused a lot of people in government and throughout the country to debate the
constitutionality of this action, and whether or not it destroys the separation of powers
principles. Article I of the United States Constitution explicitly gives Congress the right
to make laws: “All legislative Powers herein shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives” 30. The wording of
this seems to be a clear cut statement of duty, however, the argument stems over how
Article II deems the Executive power and its scope: “the executive Power shall be vested
in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term
of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be
elected, as follows” 31. The dilemma continues later on in Article II, when it says, “He
shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and

28

Sullivan, Peter, “As Obama Returns, Advocates look for Executive Action”, The Hill,
http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/215808-as-obama-returns-advocates-look-for-executive-action,
August 25, 2014
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recommend their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient;
he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case
of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may
adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper” 32. It is clear that in the Constitution,
when read from a textualist and traditional perspective, Congress is given the power to
make laws, and the Executive is there to enforce these laws. On the other hand, some
arguments stem from the fact that the Constitution was written long ago, so there is no
way that the nation’s Founding Fathers could have known the growth path that society
would take into this day and age.
The legal basis from past precedence also creates an opportunity for Obama to
find a loophole through which he is able to at least make a case for the constitutionality
of his actions. The oath that the President takes when entering into office also convolutes
the true answer to the question of the constitutionality of Obama using his Executive
authority as well: it reads, “I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute
the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve,
protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States” 33. When the nation is in a time
of crisis, faithfully executing the Office of President involves coming up with sound
solutions to the issues- on the other hand, preserving, protecting, and defending the
Constitution means abiding by its rules, which President Obama would not be doing by
exercising his prerogative power. In the grand scheme of the federal government, the
roles that the three branches play are relatively simple; the Executive preserves national

32
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Article II, Section III, United States Constitution
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security when necessary, while enforcing the laws; the Legislative represents the people
while drafting and passing laws that protect the good of the whole nation; and the
Judiciary protects individual rights. This oversimplified way of looking at a very
complicated scenario creates an obvious answer to Obama’s situation, and the
Constitution explicitly denies the Executive the ability to create laws unless absolutely
necessary for the preservation of the nation, no matter how beneficial or necessary the
laws might be on a non-existential level.
In addition to Obama’s recent expressions of alleged respect for the rule of law in
American governance, he condemned the Bush administration’s usage of Executive
authority in foreign matters, and Article II of the Constitution to justify usage, to base
part of his initial 2008 campaign for office. In an interview with The Boston Globe,
Obama denied the presidencies constitutional right to utilize unilateral action in foreign
policy, as well as domestically after being asked about President Bush’s example. When
responding to a question about the constitutionality of conducting surveillance for
national security purposes without judicial warrants, Obama says, “The Supreme Court
has never held that the President has such powers…I will only authorize surveillance for
national security purposes consistent with FISA and other federal statutes” 34. The article
then moves into the direction of international relations, and the Executive’s ability to act
alone in this realm. Obama is asked whether the position of the presidency has the
constitutional authority to bomb Iran without seeking a use-of-force authorization from
Congress, and he responds as so: “The President does not have power under the

34

Savage, Charlie, “Barack Obama’s Q&A”, The Boston Globe,
http://www.boston.com/news/politics/2008/specials/CandidateQA/ObamaQA/, December 20, 2007
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Constitution to unilaterally authorize a military attack in a situation that does not involve
stopping an actual or imminent threat to the nation…It is always preferable to have the
informed consent of Congress prior to any military action” 35. Obama continues along the
lines of criticizing the Bush Administration’s actions, both domestically and
internationally, as a part of the platform for his campaign. His goal was to run as a
complete opposite to the Bush Administration, and he expresses his misgivings about
utilizing the Article II justification that previous presidents have given in their attempts to
legalize the Executive prerogative power. However, a major contradiction results when
examining this article in coagulation with Obama’s recent statements about reforming
immigration law- If the President cannot act without Congress’ approval on the
international front, where it is well known that he or she is prescribed more independence
and power in action, how can he now attempt to justify the constitutionality and necessity
of his potential actions domestically? Obama has begun to entirely contradict himself
during his presidency from his words in this interview, first in Libya, and now in
immigration law.
President Obama’s pre-election convictions are based on the fact that the
Constitution does not explicitly state the existence of the separation of powers, but both
on an obvious and implicit level, it exists throughout the document. Most of the law of
separation of powers has developed outside of the specific texts 36, but the Constitution
employs two main separation of powers techniques 37. First, it guarantees each branch

35

Savage, “Barack Obama’s Q&A”
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particular attributes of autonomy that experience had suggested, such as Congress
receiving control over its elections, membership, and meetings 38. Second, the checks and
balances that exist for each branch to make sure the others don’t utilize more power than
they should, such as the existence of vetoes, and Congress’ control of the purse over the
Executive, inherently imply the separation of powers among the major branches 39. While
the system applies to the three branches of government, in this specific case, the focus
will primarily be on the distinctions between the Executive branch and Legislative
branch, as that is where the dilemma lies currently. The structure of the Constitution
appears to have been designed for three overall purposes; the Framers meant to diffuse
and offset power in hopes of achieving a relatively even balance, or at least avoid the
concentration of too much power in one place so as to secure the rule of law; they had
hoped that it would protect individual liberties, although the quick establishment of the
Bill of Rights shortly after ratification shows that this was unsuccessful; and, that the new
government would promote the broad public interest, and not narrow faction, through
multiple bases of political representation 40. When the Constitution is read in a way that
analyzes what the Framers meant when writing, then the appearance of separation of
powers becomes obvious with the constitutional structure, even if it is not out rightly
mentioned at any point.
John Locke, who will be discussed in depth in the first chapter, is one of the
original men to discuss the existence of prerogative power in a democratic government,
and is often turned to when looking at issues regarding the separation of powers in the
38
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context of the Executive branch. His Second Treatise on Government argues strongly for
the rule of law to be considered necessary for a solid political environment and process,
but also includes the power of the Executive to act outside of the law when the nation is
in crisis. According to Locke, the beginning of political society lies in its constitution by
persons originally or naturally free, and it is the original and rightful rule of law that
affirms individual’s natural freedom and rationality by regarding them uniformly 41. The
separation of powers follows from this uniformity and purpose of law (safety) so the
Executive power is subordinate to the supreme Legislative power and to the supremacy
of the rule of law 42. But, under certain circumstances where the public good is at stake,
the rule of law is not adept at providing the correct solutions so violations may be
required 43. Thus, the idea of the Executive prerogative power was born, and now
provides United States Presidents, general academics, and anyone who has a stake in the
issue a precedent to contextualize an argument when looking at potential usage of the
power and its constitutionality. While Locke believes that the people will and should be
the final judges of the actual necessity of the Executive acting, this does not apply as
strongly nowadays, especially on such a polarizing issue during a partisan deadlock 44.
John Locke has insightful views upon the prerogative power that are very applicable to
the current situation, and analyzing these views will help further in the analysis of
Obama’s Executive discretionary authority regarding immigration reform.
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Mattie, Sean, “Prerogative and the Rule of Law in John Locke and the Lincoln Presidency”, Review of
Politics, http://search.proquest.com/docview/60154656?accountid=10141, 2005, 82
42
Mattie, 85
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University Press of Kansas, 2009, print. 49
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The second chapter will discuss the views of James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton, which are highlighted in the Federalist Papers and The Pacificuc-Helvidius
Debates of 1793-1794. Each of their individual viewpoints causes the other issues with
how the Executive, and the separation of powers, should operate, and both of their
arguments grow in terms of breadth and depth due to the opposing arguments supplied by
each. James Madison, on one hand, understands the Constitution as a stricter doctrine of
limited powers, creating an energetic but not over-powering national government that
operates within limits under the idea of separation of powers 45. He is of the belief that it
is necessary for the preservation of liberty that the three departments of the federal
government remain separate and distinct, and they are only blended when it is the goal of
effectually guarding against an entire consolidation 46. When speaking about the
presidency, Madison has a vision of the Executive as easily limitable, but not overly so
because the position is still in need of the means to achieve governmental ends 47.
Madison also believed that strength in the Legislature needed to be limited by increasing
power in the Executive initially, especially in times of crisis and in the foreign realm 48.
His ultimate goal, which later came to fruition during his time as United States President,
was to restrain each institution of the federal government to avoid a tyrannical,
monarchical, or overreaching branch which defuses the reason that they chose to create
the United States of America, while promoting the separation of powers and co-equal but

45
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independent branches 49. Madison’s views, and role as one of the original founders of the
country, should give President Obama a better understanding of his role as the head of the
Executive branch and what should constitute extralegal activity by the President.
Alexander Hamilton is also supportive in regards to the Executive’s power in the
government and the separation of powers principles. He openly advocated for an
“energetic and active” Executive and federal government throughout the Federalist
Papers, as his experiences from the Articles of Confederation caused him to realize the
necessity of a strong national government with adequate powers to achieve a national
purpose 50. Hamilton wrote in The Federalist Papers, “We forget how much ill may be
produced by the power of hindering the doing that which is necessary to do and of
keeping affairs in the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at
particular periods” 51. That being said, Hamilton does make the distinction that the ends
have to justify the means of discretionary authority, and, consequently, that the ends limit
the means, as governmental power is only unlimited insofar as it seeks the national ends
by the Constitution in his opinion 52. Hamilton is basically saying that the government
was created to achieve its ends, so it needs the power to do this while still operating on a
system of checks and balances. He focuses on Article II of the Constitution, and
specifically the Executive’s command of the treaty-making power, to justify why he
should have the right to act for the good of the nation while still being judged by the
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people and the other branches of government. Hamilton and Madison have slightly
differing views on the Executive’s role in the federal government and the separation of
powers idea, and have an interesting dynamic precedent that can contextualize Obama’s
usage of prerogative power.
Chapter 3 will discuss the Lincoln Presidency, which occurred during one of, if
not the most trying times in history of the United States of America. Lincoln took drastic
measures of Executive prerogative during an existential crisis for the Union, utilizing
powers that most would never have known existed before the Civil War. As President
during a time of immense crisis, he decided to utilize unestablished supplementary
powers when suspending Habeas Corpus, raising an army, invading, establishing a
military government in a captured territory, and employing tough internal security
measures so as to preserve the nation 53. The South was seceding not for issues with the
style of governance the nation undertook and advanced, but because of specific ideals
that they thought were necessary, which does not give them reason to leave the contract
they agreed upon when creating the government. Lincoln, while taking these actions,
expressed the understanding that Executive action can only be used during extraordinary
circumstances and is extralegal; therefore, it should not be institutionalized or legalized
as a common occurrence and should only be a supplement to the rule of law 54. However,
Lincoln’s actions themselves set a dangerous precedent, as many United States Presidents
following him have looked at his presidency and decided that they could potentially

53
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exercise their own Executive authority, but in situations that do not warrant it 55. Because
of the ambivalence of the people towards the presidency, there is a fear that they can be
easily swayed by a convincing president who is able to justify his or her actions by citing
Lincoln’s example, but not highlighting his words about the cases when prerogative
power should be used 56. Lincoln’s unique approach to the prerogative power, which
included him not wanting to utilize it early on in his presidency because of the dangers
that he saw with it, plays a large role in the creation of the modern president, and has led
to unwarranted uses of Executive power as Obama’s immigration reform is today.
One of the presidencies that clearly looked at Lincoln’s precedent, along with the
writings of Alexander Hamilton regarding prerogative, is that of George W. Bush. The
Bush administration’s actions post-September 11, 2001, involved heavy uses of
Executive power, as his Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) justified his actions by citing
words of past Presidents and those involved with structuring the Constitution. In total, his
“dirty war” treatment and tactics involved violations of the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the United
Nations Charter, customary law prohibiting forced disappearance of human beings, and
various customary international legal rights and proscriptions in relevant treaties 57. The
“’War’ on Terror” that Bush declared, which is a subjective and inherently ambiguous
way to refer to battling all of terrorism around the world, was used under the umbrella of
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a true Lincolnian “war”, so as to create the idea that the Union was in danger. John Yoo,
the head of the OLC during the Bush administration, said that “our political leaders
should consider new ways of addressing the threats posed by the new kind of enemy we
now face”, but the administration still uses older paradigms to justify the expansion of
presidential power 58. They incorporated the thought that Congress cannot legislate for
every contingency under the Lockean belief, as well as insisting that the expanded
presidential power capable of overriding the laws of Congress is constitutionally
guaranteed at all times 59. By misconstruing the words of the American Founders and
other prominent individuals on the issue of prerogative, the Bush administration justified
clearly extralegal actions during an ordinary time because there was no necessity to
preserve the Union from a danger, while also setting a precedent that Obama promised to
initially avoid but is now walking a fine line of utilizing for his own political benefit.
The impotency of the presidency in a domestic issue, such as acting on
immigration reform, has forced Presidents in the past to become significantly more active
on the international front. Obama has been forthcoming in this regard, but in his opinion,
immigration law has finally reached a tipping point, and had to be restructured. Although
the office of the President possesses a huge amount of power, the checks and balances in
place limit him from acting on what he wants to do, what he is pledged to do, what he is
expected to do, and what he knows he must do 60. All modern Presidents have been
frustrated by their inability to do anything about fundamental problems, and Obama’s
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case is no different 61. Unfortunately for him and for those who support immigration
reform, the President acting through Congress, or taking action with the consent of
Congress, is a complicated process that requires a massive amount of support, of which
Obama lacks 62. As President of the United States, the frustrations will build, and
attempted actions do not always work out as planned, which will be the case if the current
President exercises his prerogative power because of the precedent that it will set and the
difficulty that will exist in creating a solid policy that truly helps the situation and is
enforceable.
Defining what constitutes a crisis that requires extralegal power is a fundamental
part of the argument regarding the usage of Executive prerogative, and it becomes
obvious that a crisis of this magnitude does not fit the traditional Lincolnian definition of
a crisis. The definition of a crisis large enough to allow for Executive actions through
Article II of the Constitution, in my opinion, coincides with that of Abraham Lincoln’s
time as President; When the state of the Union is at stake, and could potentially be
destroyed even though democratic governance is still occurring, then supplemental
constitutional uses of power by the Executive would be permitted, but only until the crisis
is solved. Immigration law in the United States is not endangering the Union, and there is
no actual threat to the nation’s future. Therefore, it does not warrant President Obama
stepping over Congress’ constitutional rights of creating laws. The Article II argument
that has been used in multiple presidential administrations, such as Lincoln’s and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s, is not going over the separation of powers, primarily
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because the argument is incorporating the prerogative power within the separation of
powers and the Constitution. In those cases, Congress has, in the past, authorized the
Executive to act in their place regarding these dangers, making it an easier approach,
although they do loosen the definition of a crisis as more reference to this argument
occurs. In spite of previous examples, President Obama has demonstrated his lack of
comfortability in utilizing Executive authority in foreign relations, which is at an
inherently contradictory tension with reforming immigration law because the Executive is
supposed to have more absolute discretion and control in international relations than
domestically.
Obama, instead, clearly believes in his presidential policy independence on the
home front, which perverts the functions of the separation of powers, basically stepping
over the structure that the United States Constitution is framed around. Obama’s duty in
this situation should be to get the Houses of Congress to convene if possible, and
continue enforcing the laws that are in place, all-in-all following his constitutionally
prescribed powers. While there are clearly positives that would occur in the short-term
economically, politically, and socially, the long term implications of Obama reforming
immigration law create a much larger issue. The separation of powers principles would
be effectively weakened, and potentially neutralized, in the long-run because future
Presidents will be able to cite this action as one that allows them to do even less
deserving actions through prerogative, while also weakening congressional power. The
blurring of the line of separation of powers, and the President’s ability to utilize
prerogative for domestic policy advocacy and shaping public opinion, is unacceptable
and completely independent from past examples. Further, Obama’s legalization of his
24

actions through the Department of Justice memo sets an explicit precedent for future
Executive leaders to cite when trying to expand their branch’s power. Executive
authority, at the maximum, is reserved for very compelling scenarios that endanger the
safety of the government, and immigration reform does not fit this billing, as it is clearly
a domestic policy issue constitutionally prescribed to be solved by Congress. The longterm effects of Obama’s Executive order remains to be seen, but it is likely that this usage
of prerogative will set a precedent that creates far too much ability in the Executive to
expand its power beyond anything that the Founding Fathers were expecting when
creating the Constitution under the separation of powers’ principles.
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CHAPTER 2: JOHN LOCKE AND THE
PREROGATIVE POWER
John Locke is one of the front-runners in defining the needs, goals, and
methodologies of running an effective and balanced democratic government through his
writings in Two Treatises on Government. Locke, the original proponent of the rule of
law in government, included an important discussion of prerogative power to illustrate
his awareness of the necessity of a response to the limitations of the rule of law 63. This
discussion stems from Thomas Hobbes’ writing on the unencumbered unitary sovereign,
as Hobbes prescribes the sovereign of the state an unlimited power, which Locke believes
will become a much greater threat to peace than the threats prerogative power is meant to
prevent 64. In essence, Locke suggests that in a time of war, crisis, or danger to the nation,
the normal laws set down by the Legislature might be inadequate for, or even a fatal
obstacle to, the promptness of action to avert an existential danger to the nation 65. He
wants to be certain that the Executive emergency powers in their simplest form are those
power the Executive gains, or uses, during a time of crisis to end the event and preserve
the state swiftly with the appropriate amount of energy as well as be held fully
accountable due to the singularity of the decision to respond to the crisis 66. While Locke
may be more supportive of Obama’s decision to exercise his prerogative power in
restructuring immigration law than the other men being discussed, his commitment to the
rule of law, his description of Legislative supremacy domestically, and the fact that he
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makes a distinction between utilizing the power out of necessity versus frustration,
clearly shows that he would not be in support of Obama’s use and the precedent it could
set for the usurpation of Legislative powers.
Locke’s discussion of Executive discretionary authority begins when he examines
the aptitude of Legislative power, and its necessity for the successful governance of all
democratic commonwealths. Locke says, “THE great end of man’s entering into society,
being the enjoyment of their properties in peace and safety, and the great instrument and
means of that being the laws established in that society; the first and fundamental positive
law of all commonwealth’s is the establishing of the legislative power; as the first and
fundamental natural law, which is to govern even the legislative itself, is the preservation
of the society, and (as far as will consist with the public good) of every person in it”(John
Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Section 134) 67. The necessity of Legislative power
in democratic government is a result of Locke’s idea that the rule of law must reign
supreme, as strict law-following is the only way to eliminate subjectivity in government
and treatment of a government’s citizens. Locke goes on to say; “…which has not its
sanction from that legislative which the public has chosen and appointed: for without this
the law could not have that, which is absolutely necessary to its being a law, the consent
of the society, over whom no body can have a power to make, but by their own consent,
and by authority received from them”(Locke, Section 134). Because the initial idea of a
social contract, and democratic governance, is that the people agree to relinquish some of
their freedoms for their safety, and instead will choose representatives that will make
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decisions for the “common good”, Locke finds that the Legislature is the ultimate
necessary entity so as to have the rule of law above all else in ordinary circumstances.
Locke’s commentary of the Legislative power continues by explaining the lack of
ability of the institution to violate the natural rights and agreements of the people. He
says, “It is not, nor can possibly be absolutely arbitrary over the lives and fortunes of the
people: for it being but the joint power of every member of the society given up to that
person, or assembly, which is legislator; it can be no more than those persons had in a
state of nature before they entered into society… Their power, in the utmost bounds of it,
is limited to the public good of the society… The rules that they make for other men’s
actions, must, as well as their own and other men’s actions, be conformable to the law of
nature” (Locke, Section 135). In this case, the “law of nature” is that of the right of man
to life, liberty, and property, all of which the Legislative power must abide by so as to be
considered legitimate in its rule. The law of nature, therefore, prescribes that this would
be a violation of a constitution by which the people determined the Legislature to be the
regular authority 68. Furthermore, Locke prescribes the Legislative institution’s
“commitment to dispensing justice, deciding the rights of the subject by promoting
standing laws, and authorizing judges to enforce these laws” (Locke, Section 135).
Absolute arbitrary power and governing with settled standing laws are inherently in
tension, as they are unable to work together with the purpose of society and
government 69.
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A major risk of Legislative domain for Locke is the possibility of the transfer of
the power from the Legislative to any other individuals or entities in the system of
government. Accountability to the people, as they are the ones alone who can appoint and
constitute the Legislative, is the emphasis and purpose because it is derived from the
people by a voluntary grant and institution, and only the Legislative has the power to
make laws 70. He establishes that Executive power, when placed anywhere but in a person
that also has a share in the Legislative, is visibly subordinate and accountable to it and
exists for the supreme execution of the laws, not to create laws 71. This is an important
point because it applies to the case of President Obama and immigration reform; Obama
has become the supreme legislator in issuing his Executive decree even though in no case
does the original prerogative power thinker express any one man’s ability to create laws
other than the Legislative branch. Because the laws need enforcing, Locke establishes the
idea of the Executive, and its distinction from the Legislative, which eventually leads to
his discussion of prerogative power and its place in a Legislative-dominant style of
governance.
The movement to the discussion of the prerogative power in democratic
government then follows, manifesting from the idea that several things should be left to
the Executive’s discretion since the common good of the society and its continuation is of
upmost importance. Locke begins by saying, “…for the legislators not being able to
foresee, and provide by laws, for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of
the laws, having the power in his hands, has by the common law of nature a right to make
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use of it for the good of society, in many cases, where the municipal law has given no
direction…Many things there are, which the law can by no means provide for and those
must necessarily be left to the discretion of him that has the executive power in his hands,
to be ordered by him as the public good and advantage shall require” (Locke, Section
159). It follows that given the impossibility of the ordinary rule of law to anticipate all
powers that might become necessary in any given exigency, a power must exist that is not
within the bounds of this necessary rule of law 72. Locke deems prerogative as the power
to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law and
sometimes even against it; because some governments do not always have the lawmaking
power and can be too slow-acting and convoluted, the Executive may need flexibility to
do things that the laws do not prescribe him the power to do 73.
While the existence of the prerogative power is necessary in Locke’s prescribed
form of government, it is still most accountable to the people that are being governed. An
issue arises, as Locke expresses doubts that the people will not scrutinize and harshly
judge the usage of Executive discretion; the people are seldom examining its usage, so
long as it is meant for the relative good of the people and not obviously doing them any
damage 74. In the early days of government Locke acknowledges that it is conceivable that
it was primarily executed through paternal prerogative, as there likely was not enough
development in the rule of law in these societies for the laws to be able to sufficiently
govern the people; now, however, the people have found that they must declare
limitations on prerogative for their own good as they gain more experience being
72
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governed 75. These restrictions lead to one of, if not, the most well-known quotes from
Two Treatises of Government, with Locke saying, “Upon this is founded that saying, That
the reigns of good princes have been always most dangerous to the liberties of their
people: for when their successors, managing the government with different thoughts,
would draw the actions of those good rulers into precedent, and make them the standard
of their prerogative, as if what had been done only for the good of the people was a right
in them to do…” (Locke, Section 166). The idea of prerogative precedent that can be
potentially set applies directly the overhaul of immigration law, as Obama is utilizing
legal justifications along with precedents set by President Lincoln during the existential
crisis that was the Civil War, among other examples. The Bush Administration also
looked at Lincoln’s precedent, as well as that set in The Federalist Papers by Alexander
Hamilton, to commit and justify allegedly constitutional activities. The danger of
precedent has long been exacerbated throughout modern history, and Obama’s usage of
Executive discretionary authority will further the likelihood of future Executive’s going
beyond the scope of the rule of law in ordinary situations.
Locke prescribes the necessity of the people to be committed to their own
preservation and survival as no Executive action that results in the injury or damage of
the people is justifiable. Locke says, “And this judgment cannot part with, it being out of
a man’s power so as to submit himself to another, as to give him a liberty to destroy him;
God and nature never allowing a man so as to abandon himself, as to neglect his own
preservation: and since he cannot take away his own life, neither can he give another
power to take it… But this the executive power, or wise princes, never need come in
75

Locke, Section 162

31

danger of: and it is the thing, of all others, they have most need to avoid, as of all others
the most perilous” (Locke, Section 168). Natural law prescribes individual men the right
to fight for their survival, as well as their ability to avoid injury, so once an Executive
violates these natural rights through the usage of prerogative, or a different power, the
rule of law must take over, along with accountability to the people. An Executive
exercising prerogative, in Locke’s opinion, must take every action that he or she can to
avoid injury to the people, as they are then able to appeal to heaven and the rule of law
for the removal of said Executive. However, the deception of a strong Executive in his
uses of discretionary authority is an issue that arises with the people’s judgment. The
majority of people will not be moved by Executive usurpation of what are prescribed
Legislative powers and will not be moved by the unnecessary abuse of the rights of a
minority, even if it is a significant one, within a society 76. Further, the people’s limited
sense of government and their own well-being allows a ruler who knows how to make it
appear to his people that he is consistently acting for the greater common good to explain
soundly and convincingly the appearance of oppression or usurpation 77. In Locke’s
opinion, this deception would be impossible if the people felt oppressed directly, but
when they cannot see the immediate effects upon themselves it is far easier for a ruler to
slip by without being held accountable to what ultimately can be considered unjust
actions 78. In essence, the necessary power of the Executive combined with the people’s
natural tendency to allow those with confidence, knowledge, and wit to reign supreme
creates a serious threat to the security of many individuals within a society. The
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promulgation of requirement of a sound constitution, and consequently the rule of law
arises, so as to protect the individual rights of as many as possible against the problematic
existence of Executive discretion 79. The Executive’s accountability to the people and the
rule of law stops usurpation of powers from other necessary functions of the government,
and therefore is necessary, even when exercising prerogative for the common good of
society, as prerogative is institutionalized in political society by the rule of law 80.
Locke, as a whole, expresses a deep willingness to give significantly more leeway
to the Executive in matters of foreign affairs, depending on them being truly foreign.
Domestically, the Executive power can and must be susceptible to direction by standing
laws, as the Lockean paradigm is meant to limit the immense power and continued
growth of the Executive because of the dangers that can emanate 81. His first articulation
of the distinction between foreign and domestic powers occurs when describing the
“Federative” power (the power to direct foreign affairs): “This therefore contains the
power of war and peace, leagues and alliances, and all the transactions, with all persons
and communities without the common-wealth, and may be called federative, if anyone
pleases” (Locke, Section 146). He continues, “And though this federative power in the
well or ill management of it be of great moment to the common-wealth, yet it is much
less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws, than the executive; and
so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those, whose hands it is in, to
be managed for the public good…” (Locke, Section 147). This distinction between the
Federative and the Executive power occurs because in the Executive’s case, the laws
79
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concern how the people relate and interact with one another within society; the
Federative power, in an opposing fashion, exits to respond to the actions of foreigners,
which can vary greatly and are difficult to anticipate by standing laws, so trust must be
given to this power to do whatever is best for the society, government, and people.
Distinguishing these powers establishes different uses of the rule of law to govern the
Executive.
The separation of powers that Locke advocates for (specifically the distinction
between the Legislative power and Executive power) exists to force the Executive to
provide reasons for his actions to the other independent branches so as to improve all of
their functions, while also creating limits on the other branches so neither has the final
authoritative distinction 82. Locke, in his lifetime, saw the results of when a Legislative
body is not constrained by an Executive during the “Long Parliament” and the reign of
Cromwell, and what can happen when the King is not constrained by Parliament, when
Charles II continuously cancelled Parliamentary meetings through much of the 1680’s 83.
These examples have caused him to understand the importance of a system of separation
of powers and checks and balances between branches 84. In addition, the people being
governed must also be given justification for the Executive’s actions in Locke’s system,
so as to prove to them that these actions were taken for the benefit of the common good,
as opposed to hurting those being governed. That being said, because Executive
prerogative allows the government to act in certain exigencies outside the authority
provided by the existing laws, it is a crucial supplement to the constitutional order created
82
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by these standing laws 85. Part of the promise of Executive power is that it allows the
Legislature to leave certain kinds of actions either outside the scope of ordinary
governmental legal authority, and for the Constitution to remain, but the entity as a whole
to be able to handle unforeseen circumstances. Locke’s major assumption of an essential
relationship between liberalism— the government’s aims to secure the people’s lives,
liberties, and properties— and constitutionalism— the government acts according to
established, standing laws that apply to everybody equally— is a necessity to continue
the viability of the regime 86.
The Two Treatises of Government establishes goals for the overall good
governance of a regime in order to provide a compelling reason for each branch and
entity to be able to limit each other and effectively rule over its constituents. First, Locke
wants to use the principles of natural law to override the controversy between the
Legislative branch and the Executive branch by showing that it is unacceptable for either
to act contrary to the proper ends of government and acceptable for either to act to
achieve those ends with the rest of the government’s approval of the actions taken and the
powers exercised 87. The long lasting protection of liberty is a priority, and the superiority
of the rule of law is a more dependable method to achieve this; together, they give us a
predictable landscape of government, as opposed to allowing for an unpredictable ruler to
take control in all instances 88. Executive power is a constitutional authority distinct from
and superior to normal legislation, but also confines prerogative within fundamental
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“legal” limits, such as the rule of law, accountability, the people, so as to be able to
identify usurpations and tyranny89. When the Executive claims his prudence to administer
his power within the laws, and in terms of his space for discretion, as he sees fit, it does
not prove that he is superior or independent to the Legislature; if the Executive
successfully argues that he cannot be legitimately curtailed or questioned, the regime has
become imbalanced, as the rule of law becomes a meaningless defense against
arbitrariness 90. Prerogative, as it appears to Locke, must be understood to be a natural
power and beyond constitutional control—as it stands outside of the government’s
constitution because its logic denies that a good constitution is sufficient for liberal
constitutional governance 91.
Constitutionalism is intrinsically tied to the Legislature rather than to the
Executive, so if an original constitution can make it clear to the people that laws are only
properly made by the Legislative branch, and it is understood as separate from the
Executive branch, then legislators have the ability to demonstrate to the people that their
constitutional powers are being breached when Executives seek to do too many things
outside of their prescribed powers 92. Overall, the necessity of democratic governance to
rely on a set of written laws in the form of a constitution allows for both Executive and
Legislative accountability in their actions, but Locke still contests that the prerogative
power can be necessary outside of the rule of law, as long as the people approve of the
actions and they are for the common good of the society.
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The United States government, and the Constitution, is modeled consistently with
Locke’s prescription of ideal democratic governmental form for persistence of the
society, as well as existence of prerogative but not in its constitutionality. First, in regards
to foreign affairs, the Executive has a significantly larger amount of unchecked power
than domestically as there is no societal governing document that he must abide by.
However, currently, Barack Obama has expressed opposing beliefs to this, which is very
rare for an American president. He believes that the Executive is more accountable to
Congress on foreign affairs, citing the Bush Administration, and that he has the ability to
be independent of Congress domestically and reform immigration law. This belief
inherently goes against Locke’s writings, primarily due to the premise that he is violating
the rule of law, and the constitutionally prescribed powers that the Legislature has, to
resolve a non-existential issue that only some consider a crisis of magnitude. Inability to
fulfill duties, as Locke has said, is not a reason for the Executive to be able to exercise
prerogative discretion, as the lawmaking power is entirely given to the Legislature by the
United States’ fundamental Constitution. Locke realizes that the extraordinary is an
ordinary part of politics 93, with the definition of extraordinary being an incident placing
the nation at risk that the Constitution, and the laws that have been made subsequently,
are unable to prescribe a solution to, which is why prerogative exists. However, the
Obama Immigration Order is not one that meets the standard of the definition of
extraordinary circumstances. The legislators in Congress are openly pointing to the
Constitution, and Obama’s violation of it, as Locke exactly said should be able to happen
because of the supreme rule of law and supreme document. Immigration law is explicitly
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under Congress’ jurisdiction, and therefore, the Executive has no right, in Locke’s view,
to step over the Legislature’s explicit powers and create a solution unilaterally to a
domestic legal issue.
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CHAPTER 3: ALEXANDER HAMILTON’S
ENERGETIC EXECUTIVE AND JAMES MADISON’S
SEPARATION OF POWERS
The Federalist Papers were written primarily by Alexander Hamilton and James
Madison, two of the most prominent Founding Fathers in terms of their contributions to
the United States’ constitutional structure. The papers were published during 1787 and
1788 in multiple New York State newspapers to persuade voters in New York to ratify
the proposed constitution, which they ultimately succeeded in doing 94. These documents
outlined the functions of the United States government that would come to exist with the
Constitution, established the system of separation of powers and checks and balances
within the structure, and created an infamous dialogue between Hamilton and Madison
regarding their fear of power in the Legislative and the treaty-making power later on in
the The Pacificus-Helvidius debates. All of the essays in The Federalist Papers are
signed “Publius”, but it is widely thought that Hamilton wrote fifty-two of the essays,
Madison wrote twenty-eight, and John Jay, whom will not be discussed, wrote the
remaining five 95. When Madison formulated the idea of writing The Federalist Papers,
Alexander Hamilton was his fourth choice as a collaborator; a New York luminary
rejected him, another proved inadequate to the task, and his third, John Jay, fell ill after
only completing a short few; Hamilton ended up being his prime choice 96.
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Madison’s idea behind creating and distributing these documents, besides
advocating for ratification of the proposed constitution, was to promulgate the reasons for
why a constitution, specifically one with the proposed constitution’s structure, is
necessary for good governance. In Federalist 20, Madison says, “Tyranny has perhaps
oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a
defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional
authorities”(Madison, Federalist #20 97). Both of their commitments to a constitutional
structure of this capacity is clearly visible throughout their writings, as they advocate for
specific powers and abilities of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of
government to achieve the ends of constitutional government without encroaching on the
other branches. Their writings have resulted in a precedent of fundamental separation of
powers and a checks and balances system that clearly explains the thought-process
behind the creation of the Constitution. Since the document was published, it has been
examined and cited by many, including United States Presidents, when discussing a
multitude of different issues and the solutions being undertaken to eliminate them.
When looking at President Obama’s Executive order regarding immigration
reform, both Hamilton and Madison’s commitment to the rule of law, and the separation
of powers system, would cause them to disapprove of his power-usurping actions without
proving necessity. While they both promote the idea of an energetic Executive, this is
primarily because of their desire to limit the Legislative power and prevent Legislative
tyranny, not to give free reign to the Executive over the other branches whenever he so
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chooses. The separation of powers were designed with the idea of limiting each branch of
government to execute its own constitutionally prescribed powers without major
interference or overstepping by any of the other branches. Clearly, Obama’s Executive
decree is a direct usurpation of explicit congressional powers and the Legislature’s role in
the national government. Hamilton, although he advocates heavily for an energetic
Executive throughout The Federalist Papers and The Pacificus-Helvidius debates, and
even supports Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality in France, would still be hesitant
in giving his approval for such an explicit disregard for the separation of powers
principles and direct over-stepping of the Legislative branch. In The Pacificus-Helvidius
debate regarding the treaty-making power, Madison’s true regard for the inability of the
President to act without congressional cooperation on the foreign front clearly
demonstrates that his response to domestic constitutional usurpation of explicit powers
would not be one of support, although he mildly contradicts his original line of thought
articulated in The Federalist Papers. Further, the clear polarization of thought in the
American public regarding the immigration law issue would cause both to be even more
questioning of Obama’s announcement and decision, as the violation of separation of
powers creates a dangerous precedent for future Presidents, and is currently an outright
ignorance of constitutional laws.
Alexander Hamilton- the Energetic Executive
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison’s partner in writing The Federalist Papers,
and one of the men commonly considered to have played a major role in constructing the
format of the Constitution, is very supportive of an energetic Executive within a system
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of energetic governance, so as to fulfill the goals and agenda of government as a whole.
Under the same mindset as John Locke, Hamilton advocates for the Constitution to be
understood as empowering government to take all necessary actions without limitations,
as unforeseen scenarios and occurrences will arise at some point in the country’s future
that the rule of law is not capable of preparing a solution for immediately. He says, “THE
necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with the one proposed, to the
preservation of the Union, is the point at the examination of which we are now arrived.
This inquiry will naturally divide into three branches the objects to be provided by the
federal government, the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of these
objects, the persons upon whom that power ought to operate” (Hamilton, Federalist #23).
Hamilton continues to highlight the importance of the safety of the people, as well as
multiple other goals of government that need to be achieved for good governance to be
declared. He says, “The principal purposes to be answered by union are these the
common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace as well against
internal convulsions as external attacks; the regulation of commerce with other nations
between the States; the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial,
with foreign countries” (Hamilton, Federalist #23). Hamilton’s experiences with the
Congress created by the Articles of Confederation affirmed his belief that the United
States needed to establish a national government and ensure its possession of adequate
powers to achieve a national purpose, as the inherent weakness of Congress to carry out
legislation requires a need for a strong national institution and Executive 98. Hamilton’s
commitment to the idea of strength in government eventually leads to him opposing
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Madison on the treaty-making power discussed in the Pacificus-Helvidius debates, even
though they seem to be in agreement regarding the separation of powers and the
Executive in The Federalist Papers.
Hamilton’s belief in the necessity of an energetic national government begins
with his support for an energetic Executive, as he sees this position as the head of the
government with the best ability to act for the good of its people. His argument is as
follows; the Executive must have the energy capabilities required to respond to a crisis;
he must be able to use the army as he sees fit to respond to the crisis; there will be cases
where the Executive will need to act swiftly and even secretly without initial
congressional approval; his role is to preserve the state; and to ensure accountability for
the actions taken while responding to a crisis 99. In Federalist #70, Hamilton says,
“Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the good definition of government. It is
essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not less essential
to the steady administration of the laws; to the protection of property against those
irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of
justice; to the security of liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of
faction, and of anarchy” (Hamilton, Federalist #70). In other words, an Executive with a
strong right to act is what will stop the issues that Madison foresees occurring with the
separation of powers from coming to fruition. Hamilton then lays out the four necessary
ingredients for energy in the Executive—unity, duration, provision for support, and

99

DePlato, 40-41

43

competent powers 100. These ingredients all give the government a strong means to
achieve its functional ends efficiently and effectively.
Hamilton goes on to speak about the authorities essential to the common defense,
and why they must be given to the national government. Hamilton says, “The authorities
essential to the common defense are these: To raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to
prescribe rules for the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for their
support. These powers ought to exist without limitation, because it is impossible to
foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, or the correspondent
extent and variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this reason no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is
committed” (Hamilton, Federalist #23). In his vision of the United States, these powers
all should be under the Executive because of its inherent ability to act unhindered without
deliberation and with swiftness in situations that require efficient responses to be
successfully combated. The presidency’s powers are derived from the advantage of its
unique institutional position and its distinct structural functions, but for him, the ends of
the powers used must be able to justify the means, which also means that the ends limit
the means 101. Hamilton says, “It rests upon axioms as simple as they are universal; the
MEANS ought to be proportioned to the END; the persons, from whose agency the
attainment of any END is expected, ought to possess the MEANS by which it is to be
attained” (Hamilton, Federalist #23). This argument is Hamilton’s version of limiting the
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Executive power of prerogative, as he advocates for a required justification of actions,
but if given and accepted, then the actions are constitutionally permissible to undertake.
Because the Executive can be easily monitored in its actions, prescribing it the means to
energetically act is much less dangerous than to potentially risk allowing Legislative uncheckable power with no accountability.
Hamilton’s ultimate fear is a government inadequately equipped with powers to
deal with circumstances outside of the rule of law, and he believes that a weak Executive
will limit the ability of a government to make decisions swiftly and decisively. Strength
in the Executive is important, as he says, “A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution
of government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad execution; and a
government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in practice, a bad
government” (Hamilton, Federalist #70). In his mind, because the government may not
be able to foresee circumstances in which certain powers may be necessary, the fear of
encroachment upon the freedom of power is unfounded, and the Executive should be
given whatever he needs to preserve the Union and execute his duties faithfully 102. By
refraining from detailing the Executive’s powers, Hamilton claims the other Framers
provided the presidency with the ability to respond to the protean nature of attacks and
their frequency, thus enabling the Executive to respond without encroaching upon power
but still completing his duties to the nation 103. In regards to the checks on the President,
and in particular impeachment, Hamilton shows that the robust power of impeachment
might actually promote a strong Executive because it gives a feeling of comfortability to
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the people being governed over simply because of the fact that they know there is a check
on Executive prerogative 104. The fear of weak governance, in Hamilton’s mind, is more
profound then the fear of an Executive usurping power because of the fact that foresight
into what instances the nation may face in the future is not possible.
While an Executive unbound by rules when necessary should exist in Hamilton’s
mind, accountability still plays a role in his vision of the prerogative power. He outlines
two fundamental necessities constituting safety, saying: “The ingredients which
constitute safety in the republican sense are, first, a due dependence on the people,
secondly, a due responsibility” (Hamilton, Federalist #70). Hamilton assumes that the
branches will easily exchange information amongst each other so as to be totally
transparent and accountable, which may be idealistic, as an important part of the struggle
between Congress and the Executive in recent history is the congressional efforts to
obtain information from the Executive, which are often resisted to protect Executive
autonomy105. He continues by outlining the kinds of responsibility that the people being
governed have when analyzing Executive actions. He says, “Responsibility is of two
kinds to censure and to punishment. The first is the more important of the two, especially
in an elective office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a manner as to
render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than in such a manner as to make him
obnoxious to legal punishment” (Hamilton, Federalist #70). Removing someone from
office, or just not re-electing them, displays a disapproval for their actions while in office,
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and the fact that they do not successfully fulfill their roles in the duty as well as they
could.
The danger of usurpation of power exists through the people in addition to the
government, because as Locke and Madison have previously outlined, the people are very
rarely as politically active and viable to hold every political official, and especially the
Executive, to the standards of accountability initially outlined and desired of the general
population. Usurpation cannot be controlled through constitutional shackles in
Hamilton’s opinion; instead, it must be controlled through a constitutional structure that
holds those accountable who do usurp power, and the people are not responsive to this
encroachment 106. Hamilton says, “If the representatives of the people betray their
constituents, there is then no resource left but in that original right of self-defense which
is paramount to positive forms of government” (Hamilton, Federalist #28). He means that
the people should be at least partially responsible in holding the Executive at fault for
whatever actions taken if it is not for the true common good of the society, and Hamilton
finds it to be one of the primary constraints on Executive prerogative. Accountability
results from the people’s ability to allow or condemn an Executive’s usage of discretion,
the inherent desires of man’s nature to keep equal power in the other branches of
government, and following from that, the Executive’s absolute responsibility to the
people and to the society as a whole to act within good faith and for the common benefit
of those being governed. President Obama’s direct usurpation of Congress’
constitutionally prescribed powers is exactly what both Madison and Hamilton are
attempting to discourage when creating The Federalist Papers and the Constitution.
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The Pacificus-Helvidius Debates of 1793-1794 truly encompass how Hamilton
and Madison believe the Executive powers are to be applied, as Hamilton sticks to his
ideals of a strong and energetic Executive while Madison regresses in his argument and
advocates for a more limited Executive in the domain of the treaty-making and warmaking powers. These debates were ignited by George Washington’s Proclamation of
Neutrality of 1793 regarding the United States’ agreement with the French and whether
President Washington had the authority to declare America neutral despite an early
alliance treaty107. Hamilton begins his argument for the Executive treaty-making power
by outlining the objections against Washington’s Proclamation: that the Proclamation
was without authority, was contrary to the United States’ treaties with France, was
contrary to the gratitude, which is due from this to that country because France assisted
the United States in seceding from England, and that it was out of time and
unnecessary108. However, it is the initial complaint that is most important regarding this
debate, as it is where he focuses on the Executive’s constitutional role in the treatymaking power. Hamilton says, “The Legislative Department is not the organ of
intercourse between the United States and foreign nations. It is charged neither with
making nor interpreting Treaties. It is therefore not naturally that organ of the
government which is to pronounce the existing condition of the Nation, with regards to
foreign powers, or to admonish the Citizens of their obligations and duties as founded
upon that condition of things. Still less it is charged with enforcing the execution and
observance of these obligations and those duties” (Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 11). Because
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the Executive is given a significant amount of leeway in terms of his foreign actions,
Hamilton subsequently articulates that the Executive has control of the treaty-making
power. He also focuses on why it is not an inherently Judicial power, writing, “It is
equally obvious that the act in question is foreign to the Judiciary Department of the
Government. The province of that Department is to decide litigations in particular cases.
It is indeed charged with the interpretation of treaties; but it exercises this function only
in the litigated cases; that is where contending parties bring before it a special
controversy” (Hamilton, Pacificus, 11). According to Hamilton, the Judiciary could
preside over the issue in question, but definitely does not have the treaty-making power
within its constitutionally granted powers.
Hamilton continues by establishing connections between the treaty-making power
and the Executive powers already expressed and established. He says, “It appears to be
connected with that department (Executive) in various capacities, as the organ of
intercourse between the Nation and foreign Nations—as the interpreter of the National
Treaties in those cases in which the Judiciary is not competent, that is in the cases
between government and government—as that power, which is charged with the
Execution of the Laws, of which treaties form a part—as that Power is charged with the
command and application of Public Force” (Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 11). He then
supports his point by citing the Constitution’s text: “In the article which grants the
legislative powers of the government the expressions are—‘All Legislative powers herein
granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States’; in that which grants the
Executive power the expressions are, as already quoted ‘The Executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America’” (Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 12). The
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Executive power of the nation is vested in the President, with only a few exceptions of
absolute power, such as the participation of the Senate in the making of treaties, but not
giving Congress the entire power 109. Following from this, Hamilton says that the issuing
of a Proclamation of Neutrality is merely an Executive act in nature 110.
Although the Senate plays a role in the making of treaties, Hamilton explicitly
states that their role in the foreign realm should be limited strictly to that, and not involve
more domain than is explicitly prescribed. He writes, “It deserves to be remarked, that as
the participation of the Senate in the making of Treaties and the power of the Legislature
to declare war are exceptions out of the general ‘Executive Power’ vested in the
President, they are to be construed strictly—and ought to be extended no further than is
essential to their execution” (Hamilton, Pacificus #1, 16). During times of peace, the
Executive is in charge of the nation—the Legislature has the power to remove the nation
from a time of peace by declaring war, but doesn’t operate in the foreign realm other than
in that capacity 111. He concludes by saying, “The President is the constitutional Executor
of the laws, Our Treaties and the laws of nations form a part of the law of the land. He
who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of their meaning” (Hamilton,
Pacificus #1, 16). Overall, this debate regarding the power exercised by Washington
continues along Hamilton’s ideas of a strong national government with a powerful
Executive.
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In conclusion, Hamilton remains of the beliefs that he articulated in The
Federalist Papers throughout his argument regarding the Proclamation of Neutrality
unlike James Madison regarding the energetic role of the Executive for the sake of good
governance.
James Madison- the Separation of Powers and Rule of Law
James Madison is often viewed as the lead designer of the United States
Constitution, and his structure and goals from the document are very forthcoming
through The Federalist Papers so as to appeal to the people and states even though the
separation of powers are not explicitly stated in the text of the Constitution. He focuses
on advocating for three independent branches with checks and balances on each other so
as to stop one from gaining an unnecessary power over the other, which is intended
primarily to prevent Legislative tyranny. Madison, in Federalist #51, says, “The great
security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department
consists in giving to those who administer each department in the necessary constitutional
means and personal motives to resist encroachment of others” (Madison, Federalist 51).
Madison is of the belief that the Executive should initially have his powers inflated
artificially, but once the system is placed in motion, the separation of powers comes to
fruition among the three branches. He claims that it is necessary for the preservation of
liberty that the three departments remain separate and distinct, saying, “In order to lay a
due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of
government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to be essential to the
preservation of liberty, it is evident that each department should have a will of its own;
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and consequently should be constituted that the members of each should have as little
agency as possible in the appointment of the members of others” (Madison, Federalist
51). Madison later continues, so as to establish balance between acceptable constitutional
functions and those considered unacceptable, that even though power can be possessed
inherently through the Constitution, it does not mean that is translates into the inherent
goodness of the ends pursued with these means 112. However, he creates a contradiction in
his original support for an energetic Executive in The Pacificus-Helvidius debates as he
attempts to advocate for the limiting of the President’s powers in the international
domain.
Accountability of the federal government is of the upmost importance to
preventing illegal usurpations of a branches powers, so in Madison’s mind, through the
multiplicity of the institutions, each with different constituencies, organizational
structures, modes of selection, and internal decision making processes, the United States
would not begin a program of public policy or action without the examination of that
policy from various different perspectives and those with different agendas 113. He says,
“It is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the
oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the
other part… If a majority be united by common interest, the rights of the minority will be
insecure, There are but two methods of providing against this evil: the one by creating a
will in the community independent of the majority that is, of the society itself…”
(Madison, Federalist #51). The ability of his belief to become a reality, and persist as one,
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depends on the capacity of the government to demonstrate informal practices of
cooperation and mutual respect among the branches of government 114. At the same time,
he continues to maintain that the United States Constitution’s major achievement is that it
properly separates the respective branches, while forcing each branch to abide by its
traditional role so as to keep a balance of power and eliminate the threat of usurpation;
the Executive executes the laws, the Legislative makes the laws, and the Judiciary
maintains and interprets the laws 115. The articulation of the separation of powers, and
their implicit existence in the Constitution, were Madison’s security blanket, in the end,
to an overly strong Legislative. Because he is the original believer in the Legislature
explicitly making the laws in the federal government, President Obama’s Executive order
would clearly be understood as an unconstitutional usurpation of a clear Legislative
power.
Madison’s constitutional system of separation of powers depends on the absence
of the ability to exercise unlimited prerogative by any branch so that actors are unable to
claim unquestionable inherent powers. His view of the government being accountable to
the people follows because the Constitution is a foundational document by which the
people establish their sovereignty over the government, and therefore, cause the different
branches to be accountable to their document. He says, “The several departments being
perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common commission, none of them, it is
evident, can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between
their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the stronger to be prevented,
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or the wrongs of the weaker to be redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves,
who, as the grantors of the commissions, can alone declare its true meaning and enforce
its observance” (Madison, Federalist #49). As Locke stated previously, and as many of
the original thinkers on democratic governance believe, the people are those that the
government is accountable to in the end; however, Madison finds that the people only
play a portion of the role of judging accountability, as he later goes on to discuss inherent
issues that may occur. He writes, “In the first place, the provision does not reach the case
of a combination of two of the departments against the third. If the legislative authority,
which possesses so many means of operating on the motives of other departments, should
be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or even one third of its members, the
remaining department could derive no advantage from its remedial provision” (Madison,
Federalist #49). Although this fault exists, Madison is of the belief that the people need to
conceptualize every unjustified public usurpation of power ass an encroachment on the
private right of every single person being governed over, and that the public should
respect and entrench the Constitution enough so as to circumscribe the political actions
by the force of public opinion 116. Because the people would be unable to hold two
branches accountable in this situation, and because the third branch’s checks on the other
two branches would be effectively eliminated, the separation of powers must persist in a
strong enough methodology so as to eliminate the potential for this danger.
Madison spends a portion of The Federalist Papers focused on why the
Legislative should not be given a lot of discretion to exercise power in particular, and
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how the individual should be checked by the other branches. He does so to avoid an overconcentration of power in the place where it can most easily be abused, as has occurred
within the states’ governments, and where accountability is at its lowest because there are
many members of the Legislative body. Madison, to create a solution to the danger of
having the parchment barriers system that some of the states implemented through their
constitutions that favor and basically require governance to occur through the Legislative
branch, initially desired for an Executive that could act with energy and swiftness so as to
mitigate that risk 117. When speaking about the ease with which the Executive and
Judiciary can be restrained compared to the Legislative, Madison writes, “On the other
side, the Executive power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more
simple in its nature, and the judiciary being described by landmarks still less uncertain,
projects of usurpation by either of these departments would immediately betray and
defeat themselves” (Madison, Federalist #48). The accountability that the Executive
encompasses allows for it to be more powerful initially than the Legislative, and the
Judiciary branch only makes judgments on the laws, which limits its power inherently.
Madison’s encouragement and support of the Executive branch having supremacy
over the other two branches also initially emanates from the fact that the Legislature has
strong checks on the President. First, the presence of the impeachment power is
emphasized by Madison, as he consistently suggests that it must play a prominent role in
limiting the Executive. He says, citing the New Hampshire State Constitution, “The
Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also a judicial tribunal for the
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trial of impeachments” (Madison, Federalist #47). His idea of what constitutes grounds
for impeachment is different than some of the other Founding Fathers’ opinions, as he
objected to including maladministration as an impeachable offense during the
Constitutional Convention because of the fear that it would give Congress too much
power over the Executive, saying, “So vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure during
pleasure of the Senate” 118. That being said, impeachment is one of Congress’ ultimate
weapons against Executive personnel in Madison’s opinion, as it is an exception to the
Constitution’s guarantees of autonomy for each of the three branches 119. Another check
upon the Executive, the congressional check of the purse, where Congress has the ability
to control the appropriations given to the President to carry out the laws, provides a
limitation on the Executive regarding how much production he can have in office 120. The
President is only capable of executing the laws faithfully and creating change in society
during his time in office with money, thus the monetary check creates an extremely
viable and demanding position for Congress, forcing the President to have more
allegiance to their will.
In addition, Congress also possesses the ability to override vetoes that the
President exercises upon legislation by a 2/3 vote in both houses—not an unreachable
margin by any means, but definitely still difficult enough to limit the power of Congress
to completely remove the Executive from the process 121. The veto power, which initially
places the Executive in a position of control regarding the Legislative law-making
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process, exists to reconcile the separation of powers as a limited check that can only, if
the margin is achieved, override the President and empower the Legislative branch. What
Madison fears is that the veto power does not have an even balance on both sides, as the
Legislative is easily able to overcome the check, but it does give enough power to the
Executive in the case that Congress is divided on a certain piece of legislation to take
some sort of action, or it is just an irresponsible law. Last, the Senate has the ability to
deny both Supreme Court appointments and ratification of treaties with other
countries 122. These powers allow for the Legislature to have control of the ability of the
President to determine the composition of the highest Court by choosing only those who
will side with him in interpretation of constitutional laws, and stop him from completely
utilizing his Federative power to run the country internationally as he pleases 123. These
checks mitigate the strength of the Executive on multiple levels, and inherently increase
accountability of the government. Overall, the Executive is accountable in his actions
through the checks that the Legislative branch has, as he can be limited in multiple
discreet methods within the context of Madison’s strong separation of powers and checks
and balances system.
On the other hand, the Executive possesses fewer checks on Congress so as to
mitigate Legislative strength. First, as was already highlighted, is the veto power that the
President has regarding laws that Congress decides to pass 124. The veto power gives the
Executive a dimension in the Legislative law-making power, but the Legislature can
respond by limiting funds or increasing the usage of other checks in the system. Second,
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the Vice President, a member of the Executive cabinet, is the real President of the Senate,
presiding over meetings and issue discussion throughout 125. This gives the President
direct involvement in hearing what is going on with the Senate, but doesn’t give him any
say or tangible involvement in legislation in discussion, as the Vice President doesn’t
play a large role in Congress even in this position. The Executive can also make recess
appointments in the Supreme Court, as well as call into session one or both houses of
Congress in emergencies 126. However, neither of these powers is substantive, as recess
appointments can be reversed as soon as Congress is back in session, and the ability to
call Congress into session doesn’t give the Executive any more power than he already has
regarding the substance of what is occurring during the sessions. The Executive checks
on the Legislative are much less powerful than those that the Legislative possesses, which
is a primary reason why Madison is an advocate for a strong Executive and prevalent
separation of powers among the branches.
While Madison is clearly in support of a weakened Legislative power via an
energetic Executive to avoid usurpation, he later goes on to contradict himself by deenergizing the Executive in his discussion regarding the treaty-making and treaty-ending
powers in The Pacificus-Helvidius debate, where he vehemently argues against Hamilton
initial words in saying that it is inherently a Legislative power because it is law. To give
an idea of the distaste Madison has for Hamilton’s words in the Pacificus writings, he
says, “Several pieces with the signature of Pacificus were lately published, which have
been read with singular pleasure and applause, by the foreigners and degenerate citizens
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among us, who hate our republican government, and the French Revolution; whilst the
publication seems to have been too little regarded, or too much despised by the steady
friends to both” (Madison, Helvidius #1, 55 127). His frustrations become prevalent
throughout Helvidius, as he often quotes Hamilton in his argument for the Executive
treaty-making/ending power, while attacking the core basis of the argument made.
Madison’s argument rests upon the fact that the power to make treaties is a lawmaking power, not a power that involves the execution of the laws which the Constitution
clearly cites is the primary, and basically sole, purpose of the Executive. First, when
highlighting the Constitution, he writes, “This conclusion becomes irresistible, when it is
recollected, that the constitution cannot be supposed to have placed either any power
legislative in its nature, entirely among executive powers, or any power executive in its
nature, entirely among legislative powers, without charging the constitution, with that
kind of intermixture and consolidation of different powers, which would violate a
fundamental principle in the organization of free governments” (Madison, Helvidius #1,
60-61). Because the Constitution gives the war-declaring power expressly to Congress,
then it follows that the treaty-making power, which is the ability to end wars or start
them, is inherently Legislative. When speaking about the Legislative functions, he says,
“If we consult for a moment, the nature and operation of the two powers to declare war
and make treaties, it will be impossible not to see that they can never fall within a proper
definition of executive powers. The Natural province of the executive magistrate is to
execute laws, as that of the legislatures to make laws. All his acts therefore, properly
executive, must presuppose the existence of the laws to be executed. A treaty is not an
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execution of laws: it does not pre-suppose the existence of laws. It is, on the contrary, to
have itself the force of a law, and to be carried into execution like all other laws, by the
executive magistrate. To say then that the power of making treaties which are confessedly
laws, belongs naturally to the department which is to execute laws, is to say, that the
executive department naturally includes a legislative power. In theory, this is an
absurdity—in practice a tyranny” (Madison, Helvidius #1, 59). This argument is
compelling because of the fact that treaties, when instituted, are considered law until
repealed—however, because the Legislative is not in full control of the treaty-making
power, in that the Executive can draft the treaties, the argument falters slightly using
Madison’s argument, as treaty-making and repealing should be fully under Legislative
domain if his claims of congressional powers in this case are to be considered true.
Madison continues along the idea that the treaty-making power is inherently a
law-making initiative through ironic inclinations and a strong dislike for the argument
that Hamilton makes. He writes, “Treaties when formed according to the constitutional
mode, are confessedly to have the force and operation of laws, and are to be a rule for the
courts in controversies between man and man, as much as any other laws” (Madison,
Helvidius #2, 61). He continues sarcastically, “Were it once established that powers of
war and treaty are in their nature executive; that so far they’re not by strict construction
transferred to the legislature, they actually belong to the executive; that of course all
powers not less executive in their nature than those powers, if not granted to the
legislature may be claimed by the executive. If granted, are to be taken strictly, with a
residuary right in the executive; or, as will hereafter appear, perhaps claimed as a
concurrent right by the executive; and no citizen could any longer guess at the character
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of the government under which he lives; the most penetrating jurist would be unable to
scan the extent of constructive prerogative” (Madison, Helvidius #2, 65). Madison’s fear
of the Constitution being interpreted any way that the interpreter sees fit comes to fruition
here, as he clearly begins to fear the potential for the Executive to construe the original
text to give him more power.
Madison concludes his remarks regarding the Executive’s ability to control the
treaty-making and treaty-ending powers by highlighting the importance of the separation
of powers principles that the Constitution is based around. He says, “an independent
exercise of an executive act, by the legislature alone, or of a legislative act by the
executive alone, one or other of which must happen in every case where the same act is
exerciseable by each, and the latter of which would happen in the case urged by the
writer, is contrary to one of the first and best maxims of a well-organized government,
and ought never to be founded in a forced construction, must less in opposition to a fair
one” (Madison, Helvidius #2, 68). Separation of powers keeps the government organized
and effective, so the alleged encroachment, and potential usurpation, of a congressional
power by George Washington in this case creates alarm in Madison as it oversteps the
system he worked to get into place.
Overall, Madison’s commitment to the separation of powers, and a limited
Legislature, becomes obvious throughout The Federalist Papers, but in retrospect, he
begins to contradict his idea of an empowered Executive when discussing the treatymaking power in The Pacificus-Helvidius debates.
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Conclusion
While Alexander Hamilton and James Madison have concurrent thoughtprocesses throughout The Federalist Papers, their ideas begin to separate when
examining the treaty-making power in the Pacificus-Helvidius Debates. They both fear
an over-energetic Legislative, which is prominent in the individual states’ governments,
and therefore require an energetic Executive to mitigate this danger as well as execute
government in a swift and unhindered fashion. Madison’s focus on and commitment to
separation of powers is clear, as he prescribes to the rule of law being above all in normal
circumstances. He states that creating treaties is the same as creating a law, just in the
international realm, which is why it should be considered an inherent Legislative power,
and therefore, a Legislative power in the United States government. Hamilton supports
the separation of powers system and accountability from all branches, but differs in that
he finds the Executive to be basically unhindered on the international front, and does not
believe the treaty-making power is inherently a Legislative power. Hamilton wants to
integrate the ambitious into the government, and allow for sufficiently flexible
constitutionalism to allow the government to achieve the public good 128. He says, “The
best security for the fidelity of mankind is to make their interest coincide with their duty”
(Hamilton, Federalist #72). Both of their beliefs are characterized by an energetic
Executive; however, the extent to which they want to give the Executive the freedom to
enact swift governance and judgments is where the difference between the two occurs.
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When looking at President Obama reforming immigration law through Executive
decree, it becomes understandable that they both would not be in support of his alleged
legal usage of his prerogative power. In the case of Alexander Hamilton, there would be a
slight unpredictability in his response to Obama’s Executive order. This is primarily
because of the fact that although immigration is not an existential threat, Obama was
elected by the people to govern the United States, and a significant number of citizens
and constituents desire for the reform of immigration law as soon as possible through
usage of prerogative power. Moreover, if the Executive believes that it will be in the best
interest of the nation, Hamilton seems to support the idea that action should be taken.
That being said, I still do not believe that Hamilton would approve of Obama’s actions,
primarily because it is such an obvious and explicit overstepping of the separation of
powers, and the precedent that could potentially be set by doing this. The United States’
Constitution explicitly prescribes the power to make the laws to the Legislative branch of
the federal government, and there is no ambiguity on which an argument can be
formulated within the constitutional framework allowing for President Obama to usurp
this power to achieve his own political ends, or for any other reason not involving a true
existential crisis. There are also a significant number of citizens and constituents that
openly do not want Obama to overstep his constitutional grounds to complete this reform,
which would likely play a role in Hamilton’s decision to support or condemn Obama.
Hamilton is still a strong supporter of the separation of powers ideals, and Obama’s
outright ignorance of the ideals that the United States Constitution is based upon would
violate what he even would find acceptable of the Executive.
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As for James Madison, it is clearly articulated in The Federalist Papers that he is
a full supporter of the separation of powers being entrenched in the Constitution, also in
support of giving the Executive power when either an instance of Legislative
encroachment or an existential crisis occurs. In this case, the separation of powers would
reign supreme, as Obama is directly going around the separation of powers system, and
the unambiguous and direct words of the Constitution, as creating laws is explicitly stated
as a Legislative power. There is clearly no existential crisis occurring, as immigration
does not provide any major danger to the Union as a whole. His belief becomes more
concrete after looking at The Pacificus-Helvidius debates as he clearly states that the lawmaking power is always a Legislative power, and the Executive has no correct time when
he can overstep the system to create laws of his own. He also would fear the precedent
that this direct encroachment of power would set, as future President’s now have the
ability to look at what Obama has done, and cite it for even larger separation of powers
violations. Obama’s usurpation of power is the exact instance that Madison created and
instituted the separation of powers to combat, and it obviously follows that he would not
support the decision.
In the end, I do not think that either of these Founding Fathers, whether it be with
Madison’s obvious commitment to the separation of powers, or Hamilton’s idea of a
strong Executive that has the authority to act domestically, would support President
Obama in his usage of Executive prerogative to reform immigration law. Obama’s
violation of the separation of powers would not be acceptable to either of these two men,
as the founding document of the United States explicitly states the congressional lawmaking power.
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CHAPTER 4: THE ABRAHAM LINCOLN
PRESIDENCY DURING THE CIVIL WAR AND THE
GEORGE W. BUSH PRESIDENCY DURING THE “WAR
ON TERROR”
Throughout the history of the United States of America, the usage of unilateral
Executive action has occurred on several different occasions, and the results have been
diverse both in the success in combating the initial issue and in the general view of the
action’s constitutionality. Some successful examples include Washington’s Proclamation
on Neutrality and the resolution of the volatile Cuban Missile Crisis 129; however, some
unsuccessful examples exist as well, such as Harry Truman’s attempt at seizing private
property in the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer case, and the Iran-Contra
Scandal 130. In this thesis, a successful example of Executive discretionary authority being
used is one that is justifiable to the people and undertaken within the confounds of a
constitutionally justifiable crisis, and utilized out of necessity because the Executive
needs to direct the nation with efficiency. It is almost a nationwide consensus that the
most successful usage of the prerogative power is President Lincoln’s actions during the
Civil War, as the Union was in the midst of an existential crisis. His usages of prerogative
set the standard for what has since been deemed a successful instance of exercising
Executive authority. During this period, Lincoln provided strong justifications for his
unilateral presidential actions by emphasizing the necessity of what he was doing
129
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primarily to the other branches of the federal government, but also to the people. The
President took action under three principles; authority outside of and especially against
the Constitution is only constitutional when the Union itself is at risk; the Constitution
should be understood as different during extraordinary times compared to ordinary times;
and a line must separate the Executive’s personal feelings and official duty 131. While it
was necessary for the perseverance of the United States at the time, Lincoln’s presidency
provided a dangerous precedent for subsequent leaders of the Executive branch in
usurping the other branches’ powers, as John Locke expressed his fear that something of
this magnitude when he said, “That the reigns of good princes have been always most
dangerous to the liberties of their people: for when their successors, managing the
government with different thoughts, would draw the actions of those good rulers into
precedent, and make them the standard of their prerogative, as if what had been done
only for the good of the people was a right in them to do….” (Locke, Section 166). James
Madison also expressed his fear through his constant articulation of the importance of
separation of powers, and the condemnation of at the very least ambiguous uses of
Executive authority.
A recent example is the usage of Executive prerogative by George W. Bush and
his administration between 2000 and 2008, as it was one of the most aggressive
presidential assertions of power in United States history. Bush’s administration, instead
of acknowledging the necessity of his prerogative along the lines of President Lincoln,
attempted to legalize his actions post-September 11 tragedy by declaring a “’War’ on
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Terror” 132. The administration cited the words of Alexander Hamilton and other original
constitutional thinkers in a misconstruing fashion, and emphasized the necessity of
preserving the Union during an alleged time of war 133. Bush used these justifications on
both the domestic and international fronts, therefore resulting in backlash from internal
and external pundits, as many believed that he overstepped the constitutional limits
prescribed to the President through manipulation and deceit 134. Following the Bush
administration’s abuses of prerogative power, Barack Obama instituted a platform that
involved him condemning these abuses, saying that on the international front, the
President is responsive to Congress and the Constitution. Since then, Obama’s true views
may have come to fruition, or he could simply have realized that he cannot make change
in the country during his time in office under this approach. Obama has examined Bush’s
administration and it has paved the way for him to believe in the legality of using
unilateral Executive actions to reform immigration law while overstepping the separation
of powers, albeit utilizing different methods of justification. The Lincoln
Administration’s justified uses of prerogative led to examples that have not been nearly
as successful or accepted, and now President Obama has now begun to legalize his usage
of Executive authority while attempting to show that it coincide with congressional
priorities in governance using an alternative approach

.
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President Lincoln- Justified Usage of Executive Prerogative
The Civil War stands as the event that most jeopardized the continuation of the
United States constitutional order, and luckily, Abraham Lincoln was at the helm of the
country with the willingness to do whatever it took to preserve the Union while
successfully justifying his actions. Before his presidency commenced, Lincoln was a
member of the Whig party—one of the central planks of the party was that Presidents
should remain deferential to Congress in matters of both domestic and foreign policy, of
which Lincoln showed his support for during the Mexican-American War 135. Contrary to
his actions during his time as President, Lincoln repeatedly stated that there should not be
presidential involvement in Legislative activities and that the Mexican-American War
was unnecessarily and unconstitutionally initiated by President James Polk 136. The
Constitution is explicit that a President, at least in regard to war with foreign nations,
must be controlled by more than the individuals impression as to what public good
constitutes 137. Lincoln, in the case of his disapproval, distinguishes between a foreign and
domestic conflict and the congressional need to approve any action on the foreign front,
which eliminates the potential for highlighting his hypocrisy when examining his true
beliefs in future actions. However, Lincoln implies that the general public is not a
dependable judge of constitutionality when left to its own devices, primarily in the case
of President Polk because he violated the Constitution when attacking Mexico without
consulting Congress, yet because he was successful, the public ignored the violation 138.
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Polk then refused to defend himself, which angered Lincoln more than any other aspect
because by doing this, Polk implied that he was the sole judge of the necessity of his
action, and did not provide any sort of constitutional defense 139. Once Lincoln was
elected President, and was faced with a much more significant threat to the existence of
the United States, he in turn would go on to violate the constitutional powers explicitly
given to him as the Executive domestically, but because his ultimate goal was to preserve
the Union, he was successfully able to justify the actions, unlike President Polk was to
him during the Mexican-American War.
The Southern Secession crisis began when Lincoln was elected President, as a
partisan divide on his election arose; Southerners viewed his election as constitutionally
illegitimate, and a preemptive act of war calculated to instigate slave rebellion through
unlimited exercises of Executive power 140; on the other hand, Republican’s viewed his
election as an affirmation of constitutional orthodoxy which, through responsible exercise
of Executive duties, could restore national politics while defusing threats of disunionism
from the South 141. Before Lincoln was able to step into office, James Buchanan was the
constitutionally sworn President, and he differed greatly from Lincoln in his view of
Executive and presidential powers in extraordinary circumstances 142. During this time,
the withdrawal of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and
Texas, all cotton states other than South Carolina, occurred and brought the government
to a standstill 143. Buchanan approached the situation in a completely different fashion
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than Lincoln would once inaugurated, as he stated in his annual message to Congress that
the responsibility and true position of the Executive was to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed, and that no human power could absolve the President of this
obligation 144. He denied Executive responsibility for resolving the constitutional crisis in
this message, saying “The Executive has no authority to decide what shall be the relations
between the federal government and South Carolina… He possesses no power to change
the relations heretofore existing between them, much less acknowledge the independence
of that State” 145. Buchanan’s beliefs about the Executive coincide strongly with a limited
presidency within the separation of powers with no consideration of extenuating. The
declaration of war displays that this may not be in the country’s best interest at all times,
because although Lincoln initially denied the existence of a constitutional crisis, once he
acknowledged it and took action, the Union was eventually saved and the crisis averted.
President Lincoln, once he took office, adopted a strategy of Executive
minimalism that reduced his ability to bring the discombobulated parts of the country
under the control of the federal government 146. In his first inaugural address, he reiterated
the theme of formal Executive restraint, saying, “I hold, that in contemplation of
universal law, and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. Perpetuity is
implied, if not expressed, in the fundamental law of all national governments… I
therefore consider that, in view of the Constitution and the laws, the Union is
unbroken…I will continue to execute all the express provisions of our national
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Constitution, and the Union will endure forever—it being possible to destroy it, except by
some action not provided for in the instrument itself…The Chief Magistrate derives all
his authority from the people, and they have conferred none upon him to fix the terms for
the separation of the States” 147. While Lincoln may have believed that the people did not
confer in him the power necessary to act unilaterally, there were many in the North whom
wanted to abandon the Constitution because they thought it systematically prevented the
strong response necessary to keeping the southern slaveholders in line 148. Others didn’t
want to necessarily abandon the founding document entirely, but instead reinterpret its
structures so that it could become a constitutional dictatorship with the capabilities to
combat crises such as the Civil War 149. Lincoln at the outset was attempting to establish a
rapport for not abusing Executive power by going outside of the explicit legal obligations
that the Constitution created and operating within the implicit obligations, but because of
a singular focus on necessity, and determining the true constitutional meaning regarding
the continuation of the Union via his commitment to statesmanship, he abandoned the
congressional deference with which he entered his presidency 150.
Statesmanship is defined as political action for the good of the community based
on the virtues of practicality and political reason, and under the American Constitution,
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the statesman is concerned to maintain the principles, goods, customs, traditions, and acts
of foundation that compose the priorities of republican governance 151. Under the altering
circumstances of American nationality during the Civil War crisis, President Lincoln’s
role as a statesman led to the nation having to decide the fundamental answer to the
Secession movement, as the Constitution neither confers nor prohibits the right of a state
to secede from the Union, nor does it authorize or deny the right of the federal
government to stop a state or group of states from seceding 152.
As soon as Lincoln realized that the Civil War was a true existential crisis for the
United States, and the necessity for him to undertake Executive action outside of the legal
presets of the Constitution became apparent, he was finally convinced that only this
necessity could justify his actions, not public approval or congressional legislation 153. In
his mind, through the existence of the Habeas Corpus Clause, the Constitution points to
the goal of preservation, as well as makes a distinction between ordinary and
extraordinary times 154. Following from this, Lincoln realized that “No organic law can
ever be framed with a provision specifically applicable to every question, which may
occur in practical administration. No foresight can anticipate, nor any document of
reasonable length contain, express provisions for all possible questions” 155. Because of
the rule of law’s inability to adequately prescribe solutions to all issues, Lincoln
constantly referred to the fact that the people of the United States, through deciding to
elect him as President, chose to condemn the secession of the Southern states, and it was
151
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his duty to carry out popular will while perpetuating the Union through Executive
actions 156. The justification for his actions rests heavily on the distinction between
“ordinary” and “extraordinary” circumstances, and President Lincoln believed that
maintaining this critical distinction substantially removed the dangers of his actions and
allows them to become constitutionally acceptable 157. Lincoln’s commitment to the rule
of law in all ordinary circumstances allowed for him to cite the extraordinary in the case
of the Civil War, which therefore gave him the ability to take over at the helm of the
government within the parameters of the Constitution.
To begin the Civil War, President Lincoln sent a commercial ship with provisions
to Fort Sumter with orders not to return fire if attacked, as he understood the strategic and
moral necessity of inducing the South to fire the first shots of the war that had basically
already begun 158. Southern high command ordered an attack on the ship sent by the
North, therefore proving peaceable secession to be impossible, and displaying the
political and legal situation the country was now facing in full 159. The offensive attack on
a supply ship cleared the way for Lincoln to step into the situation with the power of
retaliation rather than being the aggressor, and granted him the ability to utilize the
Executive prerogative power to sustain the United States. His construction of the
Executive power conformed to the design and intent of the Constitution: Article IX,
Section IV, says, “The United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a
Republic Form of Government” 160. This section established the republican principal as a
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national political standard that implicated the meaning of liberty, equality, and consent as
principles of self-government—Lincoln understood that the republican government
needed to be preserved and that the integrity of the Union depended on and required an
understanding of these principles 161.
On April 15, 1861, Lincoln published the Proclamation Calling Militia and
Convening Congress under the Militia Act of 1795, which announced the purpose of
executing the laws of the United States, and stated that combinations too powerful to be
suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers given to the
Executive by the Constitution, obstructed enforcement of the laws in the seven “seceded”
states 162. Later on, he stated that slavery not only violated the simple human liberty rights
of blacks, but also circumscribed republican equality and consent by giving, through the
existence of the three-fifths system of representation under the Constitution, a privileged
position to owners of slave property and citizens of slave states 163. After this, Lincoln
waited to call a joint session of Congress because he thought the war would be over by
July 4, 1861 (the date he chose for the session) 164. He made the date this late so that he
could avoid potential delays, a weakened war effort, and extreme deliberation that would
inevitably arise with the inclusion of the Legislature 165. On April 19, Lincoln created a
blockade on the ports of the seceded states to protect the lives, property, and public peace
in the United States; on April 20, he ordered a total of nineteen vessels to be added to the
Navy immediately along with directing the Secretary of the Treasury to advance $2
161
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million of unappropriated funds to three private citizens of New York whom had the sole
responsibility to use the money to finance government military operations without
congressional approval; on April 22, the blockade mentioned previously was extended to
the ports of Virginia and North Carolina; on April 27, he suspended Habeas Corpus to
maintain public order and suppress open treason in the Union after classifying
secessionists as violators of the law; on May 3, he used the powers typically reserved to
Congress in raising an army and providing a navy, followed by regulating the distribution
of mail 166.
Lincoln decided to issue these Executive decrees and begin to use Executive
prerogative while Congress was not in session, although he and his allies in the Senate
and House of Representatives were able to arrive at the argument that the presidential war
power maintained constitutionalism better than the congressional war power 167. They
contended that the President is uniquely capable of limiting actions to those necessary
and because the individual in the position can be held solely accountable for the actions
that the Executive decides to undertake 168. That being said, he truly believed the conflict
would be under control by July 4, when Congress was scheduled to reconvene, but it
ended up persisting for longer than expected. However, when Congress did finally meet,
President Lincoln defended his actions to them as constitutional under the war powers of
the government, and clarified that his decisions were based on necessity due to the nonpeaceful form of resolution the Southerners desired 169. He urged them to give him legal
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sanction for the Executive authority utilized for the sake of preserving the Union, while
also demonstrating restraint and regret in acting this way 170: “It was with the deepest
regret that the Executive found the duty of employing the war-power, in defense of the
government, forced upon him. He could but perform this duty, or surrender the existence
of government” 171. He then strategically placed the onus to perform the congressional
duty of legitimizing Lincoln’s actions by saying, “You will now, according to your own
judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views, and your action, may so
accord with his, as to assure all faithful citizens, who have been disturbed in their rights,
of a certain, and speedy restoration to them, under the Constitution and the laws” 172. In
response to this letter from Lincoln, Congress, on August 6, 1861, registered approval of
all the acts, proclamations, and order of the President respecting the Army and Navy of
the United States and calling out or relating to the militia or volunteers of the United
States, giving Lincoln exactly what he requested 173. Clearly, from these words and his
actions, Lincoln adhered closely to Hamilton’s vision of emergency power and Executive
energy during time of peril and he was able to constitutionally defend the powers
exercised 174. Nevertheless, Lincoln’s strategic, true, and consistent expressions of regret
and restraint clearly appealed to the Legislative, as they validated his usage of Executive
prerogative to complete the tasks necessary to preserve the Union that they themselves
were unable to complete. In the end, their decision resulted in the seceding states
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returning and the continued existence of the democratic republic that was known as the
Union.
Congress had previously tried to derail the separation of powers by implementing
laws such as the Second Confiscation Act of Spring 1862, where the institution attempted
to take property from the southerners attempting secession 175. This was considered an
attempted congressional dictatorship, and the bill was condemned by many as it is
explicitly prohibited in the Constitution for this kind of action to be undertaken 176. For
Congress to pass certain laws during emergencies, such as the case of seizing the
property (including slaves) of all rebels, overruns strict constitutional limitations—In this
case, Lincoln’s seizure of property, when it became necessary to do so for the prosecution
of the war, does not suffer from the same sort of constitutional dilemma177. Because of
the Legislative’s inherent inability to act with swiftness and energy towards the
preservation of the Union, and to be held fully accountable, Lincoln found it necessary
for him to be in control of mitigating the existential crisis that the Civil War became.
Through trusting his own capacities to only allow himself to obtain the power during the
crisis, he was able to successfully coerce, using force and strategy, the secession states
back into the original Union. Lincoln, as a President with the previously unestablished
and unutilized prerogative powers, decided to suspend Habeas Corpus, raise an army and
invade, establish a military government in a captured territory, and employed tough
internal security measures without the consultation of Congress, partially because they
were not in session, and partially because he understood the necessity of him acting
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instantly before the war process moved too far forwards 178. He was able to justify these
actions because the South was not seceding due to discontent with the style of
governance (a democratic government still persisted), but rather because of specific
ideals and beliefs that Lincoln was elected President unfairly and was set on eliminating
slavery.
President Lincoln famously asked the question, after the Civil War was over,
“Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people or too
weak to maintain its own existence?” 179. This question has further diversified the
arguments over the legality of his usage of Executive discretionary authority, and
whether subsequent usages of Executive discretionary authority are acceptable. When
utilizing the prerogative power to combat the Southern Secession crisis, Lincoln
repeatedly articulated the need for his Executive orders to be understood as a
constitutionally acceptable supplement to the rule of law that only applied in
circumstances where the rule of law had no previously prescribed judgment as the powers
were exercised out of necessity180. He says, “These measures, whether strictly legal or
not, were ventured upon, under what appeared to be a popular demand, and a public
necessity; trusting, then as now, that Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed
that nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress” 181.
Further, when writing about his justification for the Emancipation Proclamation, he
claimed the necessity of this action only possible to be exercised during war. This was
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not an obvious usurpation of power, as it is unclear whether Congress had the power
during peacetime, but because of the crisis facing the nation, Lincoln undertook the
power to weaken the Southern states. He said, “I felt that measures, otherwise
unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of
the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation” 182. Lincoln was attempting to
create a certain constitutional standard by which future claims of prerogative could be
examined 183. While he technically did so, the ability of later presidents to skew his
words and actions has absolutely given them a style of precedent that can justify
unilateral action to those that aren’t entrenched with knowledge of what actually was said
and done during his presidency.
Lincoln feared, as those who created the constitutional structure did, the usage of
a precedent of positive prerogative power as justification for later abuses of the power, as
he compared the attraction to Executive power to the human attraction to drugs in that is
great but addictive 184. Ultimately, an overuse of drugs will make a human sick, and the
Executive power does the same, especially because the growth of the discretionary
prerogative power has a positive correlation with the likelihood that a power hungry
Executive will utilize it in an arbitrary manner that does not seek the public good 185.
Unfortunately for Lincoln, effective conduct in the Executive office transcended the
previously existing dichotomy between formal restraint and informal initiative for
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preserving the government in the constitutionally prescribed Executive structure 186. On
the other hand, the departure from the Constitution, and the separation of powers,
renewed the people’s attachment to the notion of limits on governmental power at the
time, but it did not persist. The constant discussion about prerogative legality, as well as
the return to constitutionalism that Lincoln embodied, allowed for the rule of law to
return with more fervor than before the incident 187. Successful constitutions require
popular attachment, especially to avert the ambitions of those few who would destroy the
constitutional order to fulfill their own ambition or even to promote what they think is the
public good 188. However, as the Bush Administration, and now the Obama
Administration, have displayed, Lincoln’s massive expansion of previously unutilized
Executive prerogative power set the precedent that the original constitutionalists feared;
as the power expands over time and usage, there will be more and more violations of the
original justification for the power, and eventually, the Constitution could lose its
meaning within society and Executive power could become the ultimate governmental
power in the United States.
President Bush- Unjustified Usage of Executive Prerogative
While the Lincoln Administration was a successful, and constitutionally
acceptable, example of the extreme use of Executive prerogative during an existential
crisis, there have been multiple attempts at using the power to strictly political ends,
which is the exact precedent that Lincoln was trying to avoid. An example of the
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questionable usage of Executive authority, and what is known to some as one of the most
aggressive presidential assertions of power in history 189, is that which occurred during the
administration of George W. Bush, the 43rd President of the United States. The Bush
administration, in a similar fashion to Lincoln, attempted to justify usage of Executive
prerogative by claiming that the nation was at “war” and that he was exercising the warpowers constitutionally prescribed to the President in times of crisis out of necessity. The
administration’s actions since the acts of terror that occurred on September 11, 2011,
caused many scholars and commentators to reexamine the questions concerning the
proper sphere of Executive power within the system of separation of powers 190. As the
presidency preceding the election of Barack Obama, Bush attempted to legalize all of his
uses of Executive discretion, and made many different assertions to justify his emergency
power by relying on Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation of Executive emergency power
in The Federalist Papers with John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government in a skewed
fashion 191. By referencing Hamilton as a Founding Father, and John Locke as an original
constitutionalist thinker, the administration claimed the legality of their decision to define
the enemy, act against the enemy in a superficial state of war, imprison the enemy
indefinitely without legal processes and under any conditions, and prevent review of any
of these discretionary actions by the Courts 192. The Bush Administration utilized the
Unitary Executive theory, which claims that the Executive has the lawful right to
completely control and administer the duties of his office without congressional oversight
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or consultation 193; however, this theory only applies to existential times of a true crisis,
such as the Civil War, and the “’War’ on Terror” and does not constitute an existential
crisis for the United States of America.
President Bush’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) provides constitutional legal
advice to all of the departments within the Executive Branch of the federal government,
as well as both written and oral advice to the Counsel of the President 194. Since leaving
office, Bush has often stated that the lawyers, and primarily John Yoo, advised him on his
constitutional authority regarding his emergency power 195. But, even though the OLC has
the primary responsibility of protecting the President from congressional encroachments
of power, they are not the ultimate authority in these cases 196. The administration, in the
attempts to legalize Executive discretionary actions, blurred the lines of what is
understood as domestic and foreign in nature to justify the actions undertaken—In one of
Bush’s radio addresses, he says, “In this first war of the 21st century, one of the most
critical battlefields is on the home front” 197. By using this claim of a “war” from the
September 11 attacks, the OLC at the time began to construct the argument that the usage
of Executive authority would be unlimited, not only on the foreign front, but domestically
because the distinction between foreign and domestic now allegedly doesn’t apply in the
same fashion 198.
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To begin their argument, John Yoo, head of the OLC under President Bush,
drafted an advisory memorandum regarding the President’s authority to use emergency
powers on October 23, 2001, following the attacks of September, 11, 2001, called
“Authority for Use of Military Force to Combat Terrorist Activities within the United
States of America” 199. Preceding this was the “The Constitutionality of Amending
Foreign Surveillance Act to Change the Purpose Standard Searches” memorandum,
issued on September 25, 2001 200. The OLC continued establishing memorandums like
this, such as on November 15 of the same year, when they published the “Authority of
the President to Suspend Certain Provisions of the Anti-Ballistic Missiles treaty”,
followed by “Determination of Enemy Belligerence and Military Detention” on June 8,
2002, “the President’s Power as Commander in Chief to Transfer Captured Terrorists to
the Control and Custody of Foreign Nations” on March 13, 2002, and “The Swift Justice
Act” on April 8, 2002 201. Throughout the memorandums, the OLC selectively referred to
The Federalist Papers contextualized through unrelated other papers and documents to
construct an interpretation of Hamilton’s and Locke’s words to favor the argument that
the Executive is all powerful during these scenarios, even though it was not successfully
justified as a true existential crisis 202. In regards to Locke, Yoo claimed that he first
observed that a constitution ought to give the foreign affairs power to the Executive
because foreign threats are much less capable to be directed by standing laws, with the
argument being predicated on the distinction between an internal Executive power and an
external Federative power, a distinction which the Bush Administration completely
199
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ignored 203. Locke’s willingness to give more leeway to the Executive, as was mentioned
previously, is dependent upon this distinction, which shows the ambiguity that Yoo
approached the attempts at justification. Bush would then initiate what would later
become known as the Bush Doctrine, which resulted in the subsequent United States
invasion of Afghanistan to topple the Taliban regime (Operation Enduring Freedom) 204.
Directly after the September 11 attacks, the administration pursued legislation
from Congress to empower the federal government in responding to potential threats
domestically and internationally, which resulted in the Patriot Act 205. The 2001 Patriot
Act was 324 pages of legislation written by the White House and pushed through
Congress without any formal drafts from congressional leadership 206. It gave the
Executive Branch extensive and secret power to act without warrants in the pursuit of
terrorist counterintelligence which included NSA wiretaps, granting the Executive the
power to allow federal agencies to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications
relating to terrorism, computer fraud, and abuse, and allowed for the outsourcing of highvalue detainees to third party states that use torture or aggressive interrogation 207. In
regards to outsourcing of prisoners, detainees were sent to Egypt, Syria, Thailand,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Jordan, and Pakistan—all nations that use torture
as one of their mechanisms to gather intelligence information 208. Through this act and the
frequent memorandums, the Executive branch spent most of its energy insisting on the
inherent legality of such actions through precedent and the Founding Fathers.
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Nevertheless, they attempted to provide reasoning to the Legislature on why these were
necessary actions as the original separation of powers structure intended 209. The “Dirty
War” treatment and tactics involved violations of multiple human rights laws and various
customary international legal rights and proscriptions reflected in other relevant
treaties 210. These acts violated international agreements that the United States explicitly
consented to being applied to their actions long before. Although Bush was acting in the
foreign domain, the Bush administration overstepped the constitutional bounds of
Executive capabilities in foreign affairs, while also creating a negative perception and
reputation of the United States around the world.
Domestically, the NSA wiretapping provided a major constitutional issue because
it legalized the American people having their privacy rights violated without
constitutional justification 211. Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) in 1978, and allowed for repeated amendments to be made since September 11,
2001, which have given administrations extreme leeway in their surveillance of United
States citizens and non-citizens in America 212. The Act was amended in 2001 via the
Patriot Act, so as to include terrorist groups that are not specifically backed by a foreign
government—in other words, the amendment gave the NSA the ability to wiretap
basically any citizen by citing vague “suspicion” of terrorist collaboration 213. Congress,
when approving the passage of this act and following amendments, thought that they
were restraining presidential discretion, but instead created secret courts and easy access
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to warrant wiretapping with almost no justification, which are inherently constitutionally
unacceptable and a violation of citizen’s rights 214. If wiretapping was purely limited to
the foreign realm, then it would be considered espionage, which is widely accepted and
has never been seriously questioned constitutionally215. By changing the language of
FISA from “the primary purpose” of information gathering to be national security to a
“significant purpose”, the Patriot Act made the governmental burden in obtaining FISA
warrants extremely low 216. The transfer of espionage to domestic monitoring of normal
United States citizens play a major role in the argument of the illegality of the Bush
administration’s actions, and have potentially paved the way for further constitutional
violations to become acceptable, so long as the Legislature approves at the time.
Congress, through the enactment of these statutes and acts, also transferred its
responsibility of judging the Executive over to the Judicial Branch. The Judicial Branch
has very different political logic from the Legislative, and the Supreme Court became the
primary institution in attempting to check the Executive, a difficult task for the Judiciary
to undertake 217. The Court gaining this control discouraged the political accountability of
both Congress and the President that comes through political contestation, a crucial part
of the separation of powers that James Madison originally outlined in The Federalist
Papers and is implied through the constitutional structure 218. Executive discretion must
be judged politically, and the Courts are inherently unable to make political judgments
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and still remain Courts 219. In addition, John Locke specifically condemned the
Legislature transferring its powers to other branches in a liberal constitutional
government 220. If an unconstitutional or illegal action comes in front of the Courts, it
would likely be better for them to judge it via the Constitution, as opposed to the political
necessity, which in the case of George W. Bush would have condemned most, if not all,
of his “wartime” unilaterally enacted actions.
The Bush administration’s idea that Executive discretion is inherently legal, and
the fact that they justified his usage of prerogative by referring to a vague “war” which
didn’t present a direct threat to the United States, sets a precedent that future presidents of
the United States may be able to utilize in their increasing expansions of Executive
prerogative, which creates the ultimate danger for the country in that the Executive can
eventually reach an illimitable power. The OLC was correct in claiming that
discretionary power lies within the presidency in extraordinary circumstances, but they
were wrong to imply that this power cannot be judged no matter the circumstances, and
to claim the situation they were in as an existential crisis 221. President Lincoln feared that
his precedent would allow for a president like this to arise, as he openly stated that
Executive authority is supposed to be justified to Congress, as well as judged by the
people, so as to ensure the legitimacy of the actions. However, in this case, none of that
was done, as an insistence on the President’s inherent ability to be unlimited in his usage
of this power clearly became a commonality, and even though the majority of it took
place on the foreign front, there was no truly existential crisis.
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Since the Bush presidency has ended, there have been many pundits attempting to
assert literature that signifies the direct constitutional violations that were committed, and
many have made in depth arguments for impeachment and prosecution for George W.
Bush. In this fashion, Congressman Dennis Kucinich published a book titled “35 Articles
of Impeachment and the Case for Prosecuting George W. Bush”, where he cited
violations such as Article II of the Constitution in multiple sections, Article I of the
Constitution in multiple sections, and numerous federal statues, international treaties, and
congressionally established Acts 222. The amount of laws that the Bush Administration
violated, nonetheless during a time that did not qualify under the criteria of a true crisis,
is astronomically high. These violations have created a heated debate over what the true
limits on the Executive prerogative power are when an argument can be crafted to
circumscribe them in now what seems to be any situation. President Bush and his
Executive branch did exactly what John Locke, James Madison, Alexander Hamilton,
and Abraham Lincoln feared would be possible with the existence of the Executive
power, and now has set a precedent for President Obama to condemn foreign usage of the
power, but instead, authorize domestic usage and continue the weakening of the
separation of powers.
Conclusion
Abraham Lincoln set a precedent that was absolutely necessary for the
preservation of the Union during the Civil War, as the nation was threatening to become
divided without the consent of all citizens. However, as Hugh Gallagher has written,
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“The danger of allowing a president like Lincoln to act without regard to constitutional
restraints in a great crisis is that lesser men may take Lincoln as a precedent in lesser
causes” 223. While there have been smaller violations that involved Executive
discretionary authority being utilized, in the case of the Bush administration, there had
never been such an outright usage of prerogative and ambiguous justification of a
“crisis”. The Lincoln administration unfortunately paved the way for this type of
violation. Lincoln clearly would be against Obama’s usage of the Executive power to
reform immigration law, as there is absolutely no sign of an existential crisis, and Obama
completely overstepped the explicitly congressional power of law-making in taking his
actions, although he did provide legal “justification” through a unique and unprecedented
reading of congressional priorities in immigration law. Obama is working to achieve a
policy goal, which goes against the separation of powers along with the entire idea of the
Constitution. Because of the Bush administration’s obvious violations of Executive
authority on the international front, Obama was able to run his platform off of his
condemnation of these actions, but now, he is using the precedent set by Bush on the
domestic front, with a differing method of legally justifying his actions.
Obama is stepping over the separation of powers principles that are entrenched in
the Constitution without the existence of a crisis, and usurping congressional power. The
definition of a crisis, and of successful usage of prerogative, is of upmost importance, and
examining Lincoln’s crisis of the continuation of the Union to Bush’s “War on Terror”
and Obama’s immigration law situation, it is clear that the latter two pale in comparison.
In Bush’s case, there is no threat of the destruction of the Union, and while the “War on
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Terror” will be positive for the United States on the international front and gives a very
small amount of validation in claiming that the nation is at “war”, it doesn’t validate
domestic violations of civil rights that are expressly given in the Constitution, nor does it
allow for the violations of international treaties that have been agreed to by previous
leaders. In Obama’s case, there is absolutely no danger to the Constitution, the Union, or
any significant number of people—there is no threat to the people even in this case, other
than a sheer uncomfortableness. He has taken a different approach than both Lincoln and
Bush as he is claiming the priorities of immigration law, rather than inciting the
immigration issue as a crisis or some sort of danger to the nation. As for successful
prerogative, Lincoln’s time in office set the standards of success; actions taken out of
necessity for the preservation of the Union, actions justifiable to the people, and
utilization of powers given to the Executive during a crisis endangering the nation.
However, it is Congress’ constitutionally prescribed power to make the laws, and since
there is no extraordinary circumstance, Obama should not have the ability to overstep the
separation of powers and reform immigration law.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The President of the United States of America is called “the most powerful man in
the world” for good reason, as he leads the most powerful country in all international
interactions, and is viewed to be the driver behind domestic politics. However, within the
separation of powers system established by the Constitution, the position of the
presidency is one of deadlock when it comes to creating change inside the boundaries of
the nation. As Woodrow Wilson writes in his President of the United States, “The makers
of the Constitution constructed the federal government upon a theory of checks and
balances which was meant to limit the operation of each part and allow no single part or
organ of it a dominating force…The President is balanced off against Congress, Congress
against the President, and each against the Courts” (Wilson, 54, 56224). The constitutional
separation of powers system is based around preventing Legislative and/or Executive
tyranny, so that the democratic republic form of governance can remain and the nation
can be operated with some semblance of fairness. That being said, there are still times
where the nation needs a strong individual to be able to make quick efficient decisions to
enact effective governance. This role falls upon the President, as he is unhindered by
others playing the same role as him within the branch, and accountable as the individual
whom is seen as the lone decision-maker when taking action. There have been cases of
successful Executive actions, such as Abraham Lincoln’s presidency during the Civil
War, but each usage of Executive discretionary authority results in furthering the
precedent of when it can be utilized. President Obama recently decided that because
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Congress has been unable to pass legislation regarding a skewed and inefficient
immigration system, he would issue an Executive order over the constitutional separation
of powers that basically usurps an explicitly congressional power of law-making from
Congress. While the immigration system is widely thought of in this manner of
negativity, and generally thought to be in need of reform, the implications of Obama’s
decisions are far more important.
For those that support the presidency’s usage of Executive prerogative, both
currently and in the past, there is a general belief that the President of the United States
should be given freedom to act energetically when the nation is in need of action. Being
elected by the people gives the position the power to act, and be held accountable, by its
constituents and other institutions of government in this mindset supports this train of
thought. Wilson continues, when writing about the American presidency, by saying, “The
President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can. His
capacity will set the limit; and if Congress be overborne by him, it will be no fault of the
makers of the Constitution—it will be from no lack of constitutional powers on its part,
but only because the President has the nation behind him, and Congress does not”
(Wilson, 70). There are others that prescribe to the belief that no matter the time, there
will be scenarios in which the rule of law will not be apt to solve all problems that the
issue will face, both domestically and internationally. Their view is that the Executive
must have the ability to act without the approval of the laws because if every action of the
President must be preauthorized by the laws, then the constitutional order becomes a
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legalistic order that is no longer constitutional 225. Woodrow Wilson clearly is under this
school of thought, as he says, “But the Constitution of the United States is not a mere
lawyers’ document: it is a vehicle of life, and its spirit is always the spirit of the age. Its
prescriptions are clear and we know what they are; a written document makes lawyers of
us all, and our duty as citizens should make us conscientious lawyers, reading the text of
the Constitution without subtlety or sophistication but life is always your last and most
authoritative critic” (Wilson, 69-70). This presidentialist view rests upon the ambiguities
of the Constitution, as when read through a textualist lens, there clearly is not an
illimitable freedom in the Executive office. But, when viewing the document arbitrarily,
many further uses of power can be ascertained utilizing Wilson’s, and many others’, view
of the Constitution.
The modern presidency of strong Executive leadership was created by Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, and now many American’s see this as the norm in the position 226. In
the context of President Obama’s Executive actions, the people within this frame of
thought would approve because of the power of the position that has manifested since
FDR. His goal of furthering a policy initiative, versus dealing with an existential crisis,
over the Legislative branch has been accepted, and preceded by, many previous leaders
of the United States. A President cannot seriously expect to persuade Congress to pass
more than a fragment of his/her Legislative program and the platform with which he/she
ran on, causing the Executive to be forced to consider alternative ways of getting
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legislation passed 227. Wilson, an Executive leader known for advocating for expansive
Executive authority, writes, “There are illegitimate means by which the President may
influence the action of Congress. He may also overbear Congress by arbitrary acts which
ignore the laws or virtually override them. He may even substitute his own orders for acts
of Congress which he wants but cannot get” (Wilson, 71). When looking at this
quotation, a major question arises: what is the President of the United States unable to do
to those of this mindset? According to Wilson in his writings, the President basically does
not abide by any separation of powers principles whenever he feels the desire, as the
energetic Executive is one that can overcome any limits upon his power no matter the
situation. The fact that the question regarding the presidency’s potential unlimited power
exists is precisely why the Founding Fathers decided to utilize a constitutional
government that operates under the rules of written law.
Madison, and all of the other great men at the Constitutional Convention,
articulated the system of checks and balances precisely so that one branch couldn’t usurp
the power of another, as President Obama is currently doing by taking over the lawmaking process with his Executive decree. Constitutional government was created in the
United States to limit the dangers of tyranny, but as of late, Presidents have been
overstepping their prescribed powers on a more consistent basis. President George
Washington and President Abraham Lincoln, the drivers behind the Proclamation of
Neutrality Executive order and the Civil War Secession Crisis Executive orders,
respectively, are the original examples of leaders of the United States overstepping their
constitutional grounds to issue a decree utilizing their Executive authority; however, both
227

Hodgson, 15

94

of these examples had much more justification through both the inherent roles of the
Executive and the situation that the presidents were faced with. Washington, because the
treaty-making power is on the foreign front, and may require swift Executive action, was
able to justify his usage of Executive discretion to declare neutrality in France during the
war that was occurring at the time in Europe. Lincoln, on the other hand, was faced with
a domestic existential crisis, and therefore was justified in using his prerogative by acting
on the necessity of the preservation of the Union. While these examples may have been
necessary at the time, they were the first successful examples of prerogative, and they set
the scene for future, less justified exercises and expansions of Executive discretionary
authority.
In recent history, the Executive orders issued, especially those by President
George W. Bush, struggle to meet the necessity or existential standards that Washington
and Lincoln were able to meet when deciding to utilize their power to overstep the
separation of powers. Bush, in the foreign realm, utilized his Office of Legal Counsel to
ignore multiple treaties and agreements made regarding the treatment of prisoners and
their ability to be extradited to countries that have a history of using torture to obtain
information. In truth, Bush’s violation would not have been entirely unjustified if his
actions had just remained on the foreign realm, because we had been attacked on
September 11, 2001, and he had the opportunities to operate as the extreme Executive
because of that. However, after Bush declared a “’War’ on Terror”, he utilized the fact
that the United States was in an undefined, unquantified, and ambiguous enemy that
could basically be construed to mean that the country was at war with millions of people
from many different countries. Following from this, the administration then outlined legal
95

claims that he could utilize his Executive prerogative to institute the NSA wiretapping of
American citizens. He was successfully able to change the language of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act from “primary purpose” to “significant purpose” of
information gather to be national security, which lowered the standards of the Act
substantially, allowing for near-unlimited wiretapping of United States citizens 228. Bush,
throughout this process, sought out the approval of Congress by attempting to legally
justify his actions through the Founding Fathers’ words and the argument that it was
within the extraordinary constitutional presidential war powers, primarily Alexander
Hamilton, and was able to achieve some validation for his actions.
President Obama, in his Executive order regarding immigration reform, did not
look for any validation from Congress, as he understood that there would be absolutely
no realistic chance for him to do so and he made no attempt in claiming the nation is in
crisis. He previously has made multiple attempts even from his time in the Legislative
branch to reform immigration law by passing bills; unfortunately, the congressional
process is complicated due to the number of committees, subcommittees, and varieties of
individual interests and egos that have to be accommodated for in one way or another
create a near impossible likelihood that a full bill will be passed without amendments
being made 229. In the document published by the Department of Justice articulating the
legal backing that Obama has, it says, “Prosecutorial discretion—the power of the
Executive to determine when to enforce the law—is one of the most well-established
traditions in American law. Prosecutorial discretion is in, in particular, central to the
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enforcement of immigration law against removable noncitizens. As the Supreme Court
has said, ‘The broad discretion exercised by immigration officials’ is ‘[a] principal
feature of the removal system’ Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499
(2012)” 230. The letter continues, “There are, of course, limits on the prosecutorial
discretion that may be exercised by the Executive Branch. We would not endorse an
Executive action that constituted an abdication of the President’s responsibility to enforce
the law or that was inconsistent with the purposes underlying a statutory scheme. But
these limits on the lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion are not breached
here…Both the setting of removal priorities and the use of deferred action are wellestablished ways in which the Executive has exercised discretion in using its removal
authority. These means of exercising discretion in the immigration context have been
used many times by the Executive branch under President of both parties, and Congress
has explicitly and implicitly endorsed their use” 231. Further justification exists from
scholars, as they say that because Congress does not appropriate nearly enough money to
deport all of the 11 million undocumented immigrants estimated to be living in the
United States, the President has the ability to choose whom he deports, so he cannot
reasonably accused of usurping lawmakers’ authority by issuing the Executive order 232.
While this is not the detailed edition of the legal justifications, the pure validity that it is
given because of who has signed off on the letter (10 prominent legal scholars at top law
schools and undergraduate universities such as University of Chicago, Duke University,
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and Yale University 233) will give Obama’s argument staying power to the people and to
others analyzing his usage of prerogative. These justifications will appeal strongly to the
masses, as the name recognition of the prestigious universities and positions that these
scholars undertake will overcome the official argument, which, when analyzed, does not
circumscribe the fact that Obama clearly overstepped the separation of powers. However,
as defined in the Lincoln/Bush chapter, a successful usage of prerogative power is one
that is undertaken out of necessity, during a time of crisis, and justifiable to the people—
Obama’s usage of his Executive authority does not pass this test.
Previous Presidents who utilized their Executive authority to shield, or at the very
least assist, undocumented immigrants have not been faced with the criticisms that
President Obama faces currently because their actions were not as substantial in terms of
the pure number of people affected and the polarization of the issue at the time. For
instance, in 1986, President Reagan signed the Amnesty Bill passed by Congress that
granted legal status to three million undocumented immigrants, and then acted on his
own, without congressional approval, to expand it even more within the next year 234.
However, because Reagan initially signed a bill passed by the Legislative branch before
using his Executive authority on his own, he was much less maligned. In addition to
Reagan, President George H.W. Bush, in 1990, moved to allow 1.5 million
undocumented spouses and children of immigrants whom were in the process of
becoming permanent residents to stay in the country to obtain work permits—This
number was about 40% of the undocumented population, while Obama’s actions in 2014
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affects about 45% of the undocumented population 235. Due to the lack of polarization on
the issue at the time, and the other issues that were capturing the United States’ attention,
there was no backlash against either of the presidents at the time, and the constitutionality
of the decision faded to the background. Further, these exercises of Executive prerogative
should not be deemed acceptable, just as Obama’s is not constitutional.
Those that are not in support of Obama’s usage of prerogative have taken to
vocalizing their disapproval, and some of these people have worked closely with the
current President in the past. The primary issue, and the one that is absolutely the most
compelling as to why President Obama is wrong in issuing this Executive order, is the
purposeful existence of the separation of powers, and his usurpation of Legislative
explicit authority. The power to legislate, and pass laws, is entirely and explicitly
prescribed to Congress in Article I of the Constitution, which, in my opinion, allows the
Legislature, and only the Legislature, to create legislation. Clearly, past Presidents, and
now Obama, have been attempting to circumscribe their constitutionally given powers,
but I do not agree that any of them have succeeded in justifying their attempts without an
existential crisis or true war. The United States’ government is entirely based around the
system of checks and balances, and the idea that ambition must counteract ambition, yet
in recent history, individual ambition in the Executive has been overcoming collective
ambition within the Legislative branch. This has been done through the ambiguous
citations of constitutional text, and past precedents, so as to continue the expansion of
Executive authority prior to Obama, although Obama makes no attempt at justification
out of necessity. George W. Bush’s administration was unsuccessful in passing an
235
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immigration system overhaul through the Senate, and was then told that the President
couldn’t reshape the system through Executive prerogative by his own legal team 236. In
other words, Bush, a President who didn’t hesitate to create the “’War’ on Terror” and
utilize it to expand Executive power domestically and internationally, forfeited the idea
of immigration reform and moved on for his last 18 months in office 237. The President
preceding Obama, who is known as one of the most expansive Executive regimes in the
history of the United States, could not find the legal justification for overhauling the
immigration reform, even after discovering a method to institute the NSA wiretapping
upon the United States’ citizens. The United States has survived, and flourished, on the
words and meanings of the Constitution for its entire history, but Obama is in the process
of venturing down the path of straying from the Constitution’s explicitly prescribed
powers for the co-equal branches in his actions regarding immigration.
Not only does the initial violation of the constitutional system create a major
issue, the precedent that President Obama has now set in regards to expansive Executive
prerogative powers is even more dangerous. Precedence is entirely what the Founding
Fathers’ feared, as the more expansive precedents already set become, the easier it
becomes for the current President to expand even more on the Executive’s authority to
act unilaterally. David Martin, a University of Virginia law professor who was a counsel
at the Department of Homeland Security in 2009 and 2010, has said that beyond the
question of whether Obama was staying within the bounds of his constitutionally
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prescribed power (which he isn’t), the issue for the future is the precedent set because
even if his directive is legally defensible, it is paving the way for future presidents to act
to contravene laws 238. The past has shown how one initial precedent, meaning the one set
by Abraham Lincoln, may be acceptable at the time, but has now slowly allowed for the
Executive power to continue to grow as uses of it become more common and frequent.
Lincoln’s usage of Executive prerogative, unlike Obama’s, was actually to combat an
extraordinary and existential crisis, the Civil War. The War crisis posed a direct threat to
the persistence of the Union and endangered the people, which in turn gave validation to
the uses of Executive authority. In our current system, there is no absolute existential
threat to the persistence of the United States, and no direct threat to the population, that
results from the faulty immigration system.
Using this logic, President Bush, when acting in the “’War’ on Terror”, was more
justified in using his prerogative because there was at least some sort of threat to the
population and the nation, whereas Obama, if anything, has placed the people more in
danger by potentially allowing criminals to remain in the United States. American
citizens have also realized this fear, as Sheriff Joe Arpaio, who frequently butted heads
with the federal government over the treatment of undocumented immigrants in Arizona,
claimed immediately after Obama’s Executive order that he would be suing the
President 239. Arpaio was quoted saying by a group called “Freedom Watch”, which
released news of the suit, “among the many negative effects of this Executive order, will
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be increased release of criminal aliens back onto streets of Maricopa County, Arizona,
and the rest of the nation” 240. Throughout his usage of prerogative, Lincoln never once
attempted to legalize it on a consistent basis—rather, he looked for congressional
validation of his actions, but only for the duration of the crisis, and did not wish for them
to be ingrained in the Constitution at all times because he understood the dangers that this
would pose for the federal government in the future. Furthermore, the true dangers that
the crisis Lincoln was facing posed were mitigated as he utilized his Executive authority
responsibly and effectively. However, it is totally feasible to fear that a President of the
United States could be elected into office, at some point in the future, and overhaul entire
legislative and/or judicial programs that have been in place for hundreds of years, with
Obama’s action and unique approach in attempting to justify it being another stone in the
path of moving towards this capability.
Another contradiction that has come to fruition through Obama’s Executive order
temporarily reforming immigration law is the purely political sense that the President
views the issue. In 2007, there was a strong bipartisan congressional effort to push a
comprehensive immigration package through to President Bush, of which Obama signed
on to be a part 241. On several occasions, Obama, who had by then begun his presidential
campaign, kept straying from the group’s agreements, as he offered or supported
amendments that if they passed, may have defeated final passage of the immigration
bill 242. Because of this, many senators that experienced Obama’s flip-flopping find his
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frustration over Legislative inactivity seems inauthentic, as he was part of that issue back
in 2007 243. It becomes clear that Obama is in support of certain beliefs on issues when it
benefits him politically, as immigration does right now in terms of his support within the
United States—But, when it was politically problematic for him to fully support the
bipartisan effort, he did what benefitted his political career the most 244. Viewing issues
politically creates far too much subjectivity for a president to be operating with,
especially when the implications of him utilizing his Executive authority, in this case,
could potentially change the course of the United States and the power of the President
forever.
Even Woodrow Wilson, a strong advocate for an independent and powerful
Executive to accomplish the ends of modern government, articulates in his President of
the United States, when speaking of the presidential powers, that the overstepping into
congressional authority, and explicit usurpation of congressional powers, is condemnable.
He says, “He may even substitute his own orders for acts of Congress which he wants but
cannot get. Such things are not only deeply immoral, they are destructive of the
fundamental understandings of constitutional government, and, therefore, of
constitutional government itself. They are sure, moreover, in a country of free public
opinion, to bring their own punishment, to destroy both the fame and the power of the
man who dares to practice them” (Wilson, 71). The separation of powers principles were
engraved in the United States’ Constitution to prevent the encroachment, and usurpation,
of any of the branches upon any others’ powers, and President Obama has done exactly
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that; usurped the power of the Legislative branch granted in the Constitution through
issuing this Executive decree, and it would not be approved by any of the original
creators of the Executive discretionary authority or the separation of powers.
Constitutionalism, the original idea articulated by John Locke, requires an
adherence to the rule of law in all circumstances deemed ordinary, such as Legislative
deadlock, and only allows for the Executive discretion outside of the laws when
extraordinary circumstances arise. President Lincoln experienced these extraordinary
circumstances of danger to the Union, but few Presidents since have experienced the
magnitude of danger that he did when deciding whether or not to utilize his prerogative
powers. James Madison, the originator of the separation of powers system that our
government now relies on, created the structure so as to limit Legislative tyranny, but
also to stop the other branches from acting or encroaching on powers not directly
constitutionally prescribed to them when not involved in a crisis. Alexander Hamilton,
while advocating for an energetic Executive, still believed in the constitutional separation
of powers principals, and in limiting each of the branches so as to stop the usurpation of
powers unless absolutely necessary for the continuation of the government. These men
whom all assisted in the creation of the Constitution, and the form of government that the
United States is under, adhered strongly to the rule of law, but still understood that there
are circumstances where the rule of law will not have prescribed answers. However, in
their understandings, these circumstances were of much more intensity and danger than
simple Legislative deadlock regarding a non-existential domestic issue, such as
immigration. Obama, utilizing past examples of Presidents acting outside of their
constitutional powers whom were able to justify their actions at the time, has ignored the
104

rule of law and the powers given to him by the Constitution in a situation that does not
constitute the President utilizing other branches’ powers out of necessity, and therefore
his prerogative is not acceptable under the constitutional system of government in the
United States. Condemning Obama’s usage of this power, and the precedent that will
now be set for future presidents to expand more of their own Executive power, is an
absolute necessity if the United States is to stay within the confines of a system of
separation of powers, and constitutional government, throughout the nation’s future.
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